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ABSTRACT 
 
The impact of large, multifamily developments on nearby single-family home prices was tested 
in five towns in the Greater Boston Area.  Case studies that had recent multifamily developments 
built near transit nodes or town centers were chosen.  For each town, a conservative impact zone 
around the multifamily development was established, and sales prices in this area were compared 
to those in the rest of the town. 
 
Using data on the sales of single-family homes from 1987 until 2005, regression analyses were 
used to construct hedonic price models for the impact and control areas.  This model was used to 
create a sales price index over time. The trend in the index of the impact zone and the control 
area was compared in the years immediately preceding the permitting of the multifamily 
development and the years following completion of the development in order to determine if the 
multifamily development affected sales prices in the impact zone. 
 
In the four cases for which there was appropriate data, no negative effects in the impact zone 
were found.  
 
 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Henry O. Pollakowski 
Title: Research Associate 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Thesis Purpose and Organization 
 In this thesis, I investigate the effect of multifamily development on the prices of nearby 
single-family homes in five towns in the Greater Boston Area.  In the suburban towns that 
surround Boston there is strong community opposition to development, specifically the 
development of multifamily projects.  One of the root causes of this opposition is local 
homeowners’ fear that new development will depress the value of their houses.  In order to test 
the validity of these concerns, I measure the single-family house prices in towns where at least 
one multifamily development was planned, permitted, and built. I consider sales prices in the 
periods before, during and after the multifamily project was erected in order to determine if the 
development had an effect on the trajectory of sales prices of homes around it as compared to the 
rest of the town.  
This research builds upon previous studies looking at the effect of housing developments 
on surrounding single-family homes.  Specifically, this thesis extends the work of David Ritchay 
and Zoë Weinrobe,1 who studied the impact of large, affordable projects built under 
Massachusetts’ Comprehensive Permit Law, commonly known as Chapter 40B.  Ritchay and 
Weinrobe’s work was the first of its kind to focus on Massachusetts, and in this thesis I seek to 
extend their findings to a different type of development.  While Ritchay and Weinrobe selected 
cases in which large developments were built in low-density, single-family neighborhoods, I 
address cases of multifamily developments that have been built near transit nodes, areas with 
commercial development, or town centers.  I sought case studies that embody certain elements of 
Smart Growth planning, such as building near transit and other infrastructure and incorporating a 
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diversity of housing options within a community.  Smart Growth is a relatively new and often 
nebulously defined term, but it is an important movement in contemporary land use planning, 
and has been championed by state-level officials in Massachusetts as the preferred model for 
future development.  While assessing the success of Smart Growth principles is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, I wanted to use case studies that address this movement.  
My thesis is organized into six chapters: the introduction in which I introduce some key 
theories and ideas, a literature review that examines previous research on the impacts of 
affordable and multifamily housing on nearby single-family homes, a description of the case 
study developments that I have chosen and the towns that they are in, an explanation of the 
methodology that I use for the quantitative analysis, a review of the results of the quantitative 
analysis, and a conclusion that addresses both this research and ideas for additional studies on the 
topic.  
  
Introduction to the Issues  
 
The Massachusetts Housing Crisis 
Housing availability and affordability are among the most pressing issues facing the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts today and the situation in the Greater Boston area is 
particularly severe.   A 2004 study by the National Low Income Housing Coalition2 determined 
that Massachusetts had the second least affordable rents of any state, and the Boston 
metropolitan area had the eighth least affordable rents of any U.S. city.   According to the 2003 
Greater Boston Housing Report Card, rents are increasingly unaffordable3 in the Boston 
metropolitan area, with 43.3% of households paying more than 30% of their income for rent, and 
21.5% paying more than half of their income.4  
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Buying a home is little better.  In 2002, Massachusetts had the third highest median home 
price of any state,5 and despite relatively high incomes, had the third highest housing 
affordability burden as well.6  The median price of a single-family home in the Greater Boston 
area exceeded $400,000 in 2003.7  Again, declining affordability is the trend – in 2003, a 
household at the median income could only afford to buy a median priced house in only 70 of the 
161 Greater Boston communities, a decrease from 95 communities in 2001 and 149 in 1998.8  
The cost of housing is breaking household budgets, changing neighborhoods, and displacing 
lower-income and young families.  Governor Romney has voiced concerns that high housing 
costs may even begin to impact the Commonwealth’s economic competitiveness, as firms 
consider relocating to areas with more affordable housing for their workers. 
 In the most basic economic sense, the skyrocketing housing costs are caused by an 
imbalance in housing supply and demand for housing.   A relatively strong and diverse economy, 
high wages, and quality of life continue to attract households to the Greater Boston Area, 
resulting in a strong demand for housing.  Between 1990 and 2000 the number of households in 
Boston increased by almost 130,000, or 7.7%.9  While the recession has slowed this growth in 
the past three years, it is expected that as the economy recovers, and demographic trends such as 
immigration and decreasing household size persists, the Greater Boston Area will continue to see 
a growth in households.  In fact, in 2000 the Census Bureau projected that the Greater Boston 
area would see an increase of 100,000 households by the year 2010.10
 Meanwhile, the supply of housing, particularly multifamily housing and housing that is 
affordable to moderate and low-income households, has not kept pace with this demand.  In the 
same ten years, from 1990 to 2000, the housing supply only increased by 5%, or 91,567 units,11 a 
shortfall of almost 40,000 units.  Construction starts, particularly for multifamily housing, are far 
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below the level needed to balance demand.   Permits for multifamily units fell from 1970s highs 
of about 14,000 units per year to an average of less than 1,500 units per year in the 1990s.12  
Land use statistics reinforce this story.  Across the Greater Boston Area, land is being developed 
seven times faster than the population is growing.13  Residential density is declining across the 
state, with persons per acre decreasing from 11.19 in 1950 to 4.97 in 2000.14  These figures 
confirm what is visually evident in many of the towns in the Greater Boston area.  The new 
housing that is being developed is primarily large single-family homes on even larger lots, 
expensive, low-density housing that is largely unaffordable to moderate and lower income 
households. 
The slow pace of multifamily building is not due to a lack of demand – the housing 
shortage in the state is widely acknowledged and well documented – but rather by local 
reluctance to permit and build multifamily developments.  In 2000, Massachusetts ranked 46th 
among the 50 states in number of building permits issued.  Multifamily permits represented less 
than 15% of the total, well below the national average.  According to Massachusetts Housing 
Partnership, only 28 towns in Massachusetts approved multifamily developments of five or more 
units between 2000 and 2002,15 meaning that 90 percent of towns across the state did not 
approve a single multifamily development.  As of 2001, 45 Massachusetts communities had 
implemented growth-rate bylaws that essentially curtailed new construction altogether.16  It is 
this widespread resistance to development that exacerbates the housing shortage and drives 
housing prices higher and higher. 
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The Homevoter Hypothesis 
Behind an alphabet soup of NIMBYs, NOPErs, and BANANAs17 is the disturbing reality 
that very little development is occurring in Massachusetts.  Indeed, beyond a select few urban 
areas, almost no new multifamily housing is being built in the state.   As noted above, zoning and 
other local land use controls have created this effective development moratorium across the 
Greater Boston Area.  In many towns, the zoning ordinance prohibits higher-density housing, 
and in many cases land use controls effectively rule out all new development.   
William Fischel has extended the Homevoter Hypothesis as a means of understanding 
this local resistance to development.  Land use regulation is a local responsibility, and zoning is 
one of the most powerful ways that a town and its residents can control its physical and financial 
destiny.  Since its earliest days, zoning has been designed to favor the single-family home, and 
what Fischel has dubbed the “the primacy of homeownership”18 can be observed from the 
position of single-family homes at the top of the use pyramid in most zoning regulations.  In 
Massachusetts, towns have increasingly favored the single-family designation, and in many 
localities, zoning has become a powerful and often-utilized tool for those who seek to restrict 
development in their community.   
As Fischel details in his book The Homevoter Hypothesis,19 the popularization of the 
automobile facilitated a spatial separation of work and live areas, allowing people to drive from 
their job to their home, and resulting in the rise of purely residential suburban areas dominated 
by single-family homes.  The owners of these houses developed into “homevoters;” active 
community members who influenced municipal decision making to reflect their own interests.  
In the field of land use, homevoters frequently pushed for local regulations and zoning that 
restricted development to single-family homes.  This has created a self-perpetuating cycle – 
 11
residential communities ruled by the majority interests of homeowners, who restrict non-
residential development, making the power of homeowners even more concentrated – to the 
point where communities are so anti-growth that development has all but halted.  
 Fischel explains that the homevoters’ anti-development mentality is fundamentally 
rational economic decision making.  For most people, a home is the largest (and in many cases, 
the only) asset that they own.  People are ferociously defensive about the value of this asset, 
since it represents not only a place to live, but also their personal wealth, their retirement, and 
their children’s education and inheritance.  However, a home is a high-risk investment.  There is 
no insurance system for home prices, so homeowners can only protect the value of their asset by 
undertaking value maximizing activities, such as home improvement, and resisting value-
minimizing ones.  
 It is commonly accepted that home values are affected by external factors, including the 
amenities and disamenities of the neighborhood and actions, such as tax rate changes, that the 
local government takes.   In the past thirty years, the dispersion of employment from center cities 
to the suburbs has reduced the importance of distance to the central business district in home 
prices.  Meanwhile, “quality of life,” as measured by such factors as school performance, and 
community character, has become a greater factor.   
New development brings the potential for many negative impacts on quality of life, 
including poor aesthetic design, increased traffic and congestion, burden on schools and public 
infrastructure, and a threat to neighborhood character.  Homevoters fear this risk of negative 
impacts, and worry that new development will decrease their property value, resulting in a 
capital loss in their largest asset.    In other words, homeowners are aware that if the 
neighborhood goes downhill, their home will lose value, so they do everything they can to 
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minimize the chance that their neighborhood will change.  Homevoters “…have staked their 
savings in their communities’ character”20 and protect it via the blunt but powerful tool of 
zoning.  Thus, the prevalence of anti-development zoning in many towns can be explained by 
homevoters’ financial incentive to protect the value of their homes and their aversion to the risk 
inherent in change. 
   
Chapter 40B 
 The most successful tool that Massachusetts has used to overcome community opposition 
to development and to expand the housing supply is a powerful and controversial statute, 
Chapter 40B.  40B has been in effect for 36 years and is responsible for the majority of 
multifamily and affordable housing in many non-urban communities in the Greater Boston area.  
A brief review of the law follows, for more detailed information about Chapters 40B and 40R, 
please see the resources listed in the bibliography. 
Chapter 40B of the Massachusetts General Law was enacted in 1955.  The 
Comprehensive Permit Law (Sections 20-23), what is commonly referred to as “40B,” or the 
“anti-snob zoning law,” was added in 1969 as a means of encouraging the development of more 
affordable housing.  This statute created two provisions to facilitate development.  First, 
developers of projects that include a substantial portion of affordable units can apply to the local 
Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) for a single comprehensive permit for their project rather than 
multiple projects from multiple municipal bodies.  Second, in communities where less than ten 
percent of the housing stock is deemed affordable, developers whose projects are turned down at 
the local level can appeal the decision to a state Housing Appeals Committee, which can overrule 
local opposition and approve the project.  In practice, the Appeals Committee has supported the 
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development in most cases and Chapter 40B has allowed developers to build large, multifamily 
low- or mixed-income projects in many towns with exclusive zoning rules.    
 Chapter 40B has been the single most successful mechanism in spurring the production 
of multifamily housing across the state.  In the vast majority of appeals since the enactment of 
40B, the state Housing Appeals Committee has found in favor of the developer, and over half of 
the developments appealed have been constructed.  Since 1969, over 500 developments with 
over 35,000 units have been constructed under 40B.  In many cases, Chapter 40B is the only way 
that these units are being produced.  In fact, since 2000, in towns with less than ten percent 
affordable units, the comprehensive permit process accounted for almost half the total production 
and more than 96 percent of the affordable units produced.21   
Chapter 40B has become an increasingly important tool in the production of new 
housing.  According to the Citizens Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA), the percent of 
new units that have been built under 40B has increased from 15% in the early 1970s to 81% in 
the mid-1990s.  In the past five years, 83% of all affordable units added to the state’s inventory 
used the 40B process. 22  These statistics highlight the mounting difficulty of building 
multifamily, low- or mixed-income developments in non-urban areas, and the importance of 
Chapter 40B in encouraging housing production.  Additionally, it is evidence that in looking for 
larger multifamily developments in towns in the Greater Boston Area, the vast majority of 
examples are projects built under 40B. 
Recent changes to 40B have encouraged towns to take a more progressive approach to 
planning for housing diversity.  For example, a town can now submit a “Planned Production” 
plan to the state Department of Housing and Community Development outlining how it will 
achieve a minimum 0.75% growth in affordable units each year for five years.  If this plan is 
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approved, and the town continues to meet its goals, that town is exempted from state overrides 
on 40B projects. 
 
Community Opposition in Massachusetts 
 Despite its successes, 40B has not had a smooth history.  Massachusetts is a home rule 
state, with every power not explicitly designated to the Commonwealth reserved for its 361 
towns and municipalities.  Zoning and land use are among the most cherished of these local 
powers, and Chapter 40B has been a particularly passionate subject.  The law allows developers, 
often viewed as greedy, out-of-town, big-city builders, to surpass local zoning and build 
developments that would often not be allowed under the local zoning ordinance.  Since its 
passage, hundreds of bills proposing to repeal, gut, or weaken Chapter 40B have been filed.  
There are innumerable websites dedicated to voicing objections to specific 40B projects or to the 
statute itself.  The state’s history of multifamily development, low- and mixed-income housing 
and 40B projects in particular has been one of intense community opposition.   
 In public forums such as Town Meeting and ZBA hearings, development is opposed for 
its impact on municipal services, school budgets, traffic, and the vague “community character.”  
However, in private, motivations are much more aligned with Fischel’s Homevoter Hypothesis.  
The anonymous responses to a survey of residents of the town of Dartmouth, Massachusetts 
provides compelling evidence to the entrenched antigrowth sentiments in one town.   Over half 
of the responses to the question “What most threatens the quality of life in Dartmouth?” referred 
to development, with such strongly-stated responses as: “I hope you will respond to the need to 
slow/stop growth in our beautiful town… No low-income housing… Keep housing 
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developments out...  No more development anywhere in town.”  Other responses speak to the 
fear for home values that is the foundation of the Homevoter Hypothesis: 
“Well-defined zoning laws are important along with the protection of property values... If 
affordable housing is coming, it should be in a rural area not around people whose 
property values will decrease…  I recently moved to Dartmouth and I love it but now 
there are low income families living in the Capri Motel and that they may be making low-
income units in our really good neighborhoods.  Things are great right now so why allow 
people that “may” destroy this?  Property values will go down...  Zoning for single-
family houses to protect property values so as to make the town a desirable community to 
live in...  No low-income housing. It brings property values down… Development of 
apartment complexes which will lower property values and change Dartmouth from a 
friendly town into a city environment...”23
 
If these concerns that residents are voicing are common, then this is evidence that the fear of 
property value erosion contributes significantly to the antidevelopment nature of most towns in 
the Greater Boston area.  
 
Smart Growth and Chapter 40R 
 In the summer of 2004, the Massachusetts legislature passed the first new statute since 
40B to address the stagnant supply of housing.  This law, known as Chapter 40R, attempts to use 
a carrot rather than the stick of 40B to encourage new housing development.   40R encourages 
municipalities to enact “Smart Growth” overlay districts, and offers financial incentives from the 
state for those towns that do create the new districts.  Positioned as providing a positive incentive 
for development, the statute is intended to not only spur building, but also to encourage Smart 
Growth type development rather than the low-density sprawl that has become common in many 
towns in the greater Boston area.  The overlay districts must have minimum densities that 
encourage multifamily development, and are meant to be located around transit nodes, town 
centers, and in abandoned industrial areas.  Towns that enact these overlay zones will receive a 
payment of up to $5,000 per unit zoned and permitted in the new district, and priority on future 
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disbursement of state funds for municipal services.  While 40R is very new, and as of early 2005, 
no towns had enacted the new overlay district, the statute demonstrates the state government’s 
purported commitment to increasing the supply of housing in Smart Growth development 
patterns.   
Whether or not Chapter 40R will be successful in both jumpstarting and changing the 
nature of housing development in Massachusetts is not yet known.  However, in 
acknowledgement of the state’s focus on higher-density, multifamily development, I chose to 
focus this research on existing developments that demonstrate some of the characteristics favored 
in Chapter 40R.  Planners and developers promote Smart Growth as the obvious and correct way 
to develop going forward, but the economic impacts of this type of development have not been 
studied extensively.  By investigating the effects of developments with certain Smart Growth 
characteristics on single-family homes in the surrounding community, I hope to spur this 
conversation. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although many studies have examined the impact of externalities on nearby house 
values, few have focused specifically on the issue of density or large multifamily developments.  
Within the body of literature that addresses affordable or subsidized housing and neighboring 
property values, few studies have used a strong, reliable methodology that provides trustworthy 
results or that can serve as a model for this study.  Since the 1960s, there have been numerous 
studies regarding the impact of various types of affordable housing, including public housing, 
Section 8 housing, federally subsidized housing, and non-profit built housing, on surrounding 
home values.  These studies have reached a variety of often-conflicting conclusions.  They have 
relied on many variations in methodology, many of which draw into question the validity of their 
conclusions.  I have reviewed a subset of the strongest studies here; see the bibliography for 
additional research. 
The majority of these studies use home sales data as a measure of house values.  There 
are two main ways to perform home sales price studies: through repeat sales and through hedonic 
regression.  I have divided the cases reviewed by these methods.  In general, the hedonic method 
is more rigorous, as it allows for the inclusion of factors, including both house and neighborhood 
characteristics, that might contribute to the observed prices.  However, many studies use the 
repeat sales technique either because of data limitations or because they attempt to correct for 
other influences in a different manner.  Even studies that use a hedonic model to explain prices 
often leave out what seem to be fairly obvious influences on prices, such as demographic or 
socioeconomic factors of the neighborhood, thus potentially overstating the impact of other 
factors, such as the presence of an affordable development. 
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Another major difference within the literature is that some studies capture sales prices at 
a moment in time and attempt to explain variation in prices by the influence of a specific factor, 
such as proximity to an affordable housing development, while others use trends in sales prices 
to measure the impact of a development.  The second method is the more accurate way to 
measure the causal relationship between a specific event, such as the planning and construction 
of an affordable housing development, and the impact on surrounding house prices.  This method 
takes into account trends in sales prices and trends in the impact zone prior to the development, 
and answers the question what (if any) was the specific effect on prices caused by the planning 
and construction of that development?  Without this before and after analysis, it is impossible to 
isolate the cause of any price changes. 
Finally, all of the studies attempt to assess impact by using some measure of proximity to 
a particular development.  Many different methods have been used to measure this distance, 
including basic linear distance, a gravity-weighted distance that takes into account a non-linear 
curve for impact and nearness, and the division of data into a designated impact zone (considered 
to be affected by the development) and a control area (the remainder of the study area).  The 
reality of neighborhoods is that distance may or may not be a good proxy for impact – in some 
neighborhoods, physical or psychological barriers, street patterns, or other features may define 
impact zones better than pure distance.  However, only a few of the studies reviewed undertook a 
rigorous definition of its impact zone.  
 
Repeat Sales Price Studies 
While studies that utilize repeat sales prices have flaws, there are several important 
studies of this type that should be mentioned.  Green, Malpezzi and Seah (2002) undertook a 
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study to determine the impact of developments that used Low Income Housing Tax Credits 
(LIHTC) on surrounding property values throughout Wisconsin.   They used countywide repeat 
sales data and an inventory of Section 42 LIHTC buildings to determine the impact of proximity 
to LIHTC developments on surrounding house prices.  The study’s conclusion, that there is no 
evidence that LIHTC developments have a negative impact on property values, is unfortunately 
undermined by the methodological weaknesses of the study. 
The authors chose repeat sales method because it does not require a great deal of details 
about the homes – something they acknowledged was unavailable for their sample.  The 
shortcomings of repeat sales data include the assumption that the home is in the same condition 
from sale to sale, i.e.: that the prices are comparing apples to apples.  In the Green, et al. study, 
same-house sales up to 11 years apart were used without any attempt to ascertain whether homes 
had changed over that time. 
The authors also oversimplify several factors of the study, including geographic 
boundaries and neighborhood effect, which could disguise or skew the results.   Although they 
use a gravity measure of distance in order to correct some weakness with linear distance, this 
approach still misrepresent true impacts.  For example, natural neighborhood boundaries may 
define the perceived distance to the development better than actual “as the crow flies” distance.  
Additionally, this reliance on distance to the development discounts many other potential 
impacts on prices, such as neighborhood characteristics, that the authors do not account for.  The 
authors do try to incorporate some overarching social characteristics into their study.  For 
example, they investigate zip code-level demographic data.  While demographic and other data is 
easy to gather at this level, I question whether neighborhood externalities are best measured at 
this gross scale. 
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 In a second LIHTC study (Maxfield Research, 2000), the trend in house prices is 
examined over time to see if the construction of tax credit developments in the Twin Cities 
caused any impact on surrounding home prices.  In this study, the authors used both pre- and 
post- construction measures to determine the effects of the development in impact areas and 
control areas.  They used sales of “similar homes” (defined by age and square footage, in the 
same community and school district) in twelve neighborhoods across the metropolitan areas.  
They measure three sales trends - price per square foot, sales price compared to list price, and 
time on the market - and found no negative impact of the LIHTC developments.  They also 
found that the subject areas had similar or stronger market performance that the rest of the city, 
that subject areas had higher appreciation after construction than before.  In fact, though the 
subject groups had slower growth than Twin Cities metro overall, they found that after 
construction of the LIHTC project this gap narrowed.  The authors imply that the LIHTC 
developments might have helped property values in those subject neighborhoods. 
There are obvious shortcomings of the similar homes approach.  As discussed above, 
there are many more elements to a house sales price than the ones measured in this study, and 
simply finding homes in the same school district that are of similar size and age does not account 
for this complexity.  While attempting to measure trends and the impact of the developments on 
those trends is a good approach, I question the conclusions of the study.  The authors use gross 
geographic comparisons with little effort to quantify other neighborhood dynamics.  This raises 
more questions than it answers.  While they show that the subject areas had higher appreciation 
after construction than before, did the whole neighborhood?  Couldn’t the change in price trends 
as easily be explained by other (neighborhood) factors that were unaccounted for, such as 
gentrification of the subject neighborhood?    
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 Grier Partnership (2001) studied the effect of affordable units on repeat sales prices in 
subdivisions in two affluent areas in Virginia.  They measured median sales prices in 
communities with affordable units and compared them to the median sales price in the 
subdivision’s zip code.  They also compared sales prices of units immediately adjacent to an 
affordable unit to other sales in the subdivision.  In both cases, the study concluded that there 
were no negative effects on house prices.  There are several major flaws with this study.  The use 
of median sales price is a very crude measure of house prices that doesn’t take into account 
differences in houses in the samples or changes in either house or neighborhood qualities that 
affect the data.  In addition, the measure of effect was simply whether prices in the impact zone 
changed differently (appreciated less or depreciated more) than in the control.  If the majority of 
data points did not, the test was considered to have “no effect.”  In fact, the individual results 
were varied – many of the study sales did do worse than the control sales, but the crudeness of 
the method did not allow for any more detailed analysis or reasoning of the results. 
 
Hedonic Studies 
Another group of studies uses the hedonic theory of house prices to build an economic 
model for the price of homes in the study area.  They then use various methods to assess the 
impact of specific phenomena on this model.  Edward Goetz et al (1996) used a hedonic model 
to measure the impact of proximity to subsidized housing on nearby homes, as reflected in 
assessment values.  The study found that being close to CDC-developed subsidized housing 
increased property values, while the presence of public housing or privately owned publicly 
subsidized housing decreases value.  This seemingly contradictory finding was dismissed in a 
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rather tortured and unlikely explanation about the local preference for community-based 
developers. 
It is possible that it is methodological flaws that caused the results.  The study uses 
assessed values for home prices, which makes the assumption that assessed value and market 
value are the same.  While some assessment data reflect the latest sales price, some are 
calculated using comparable homes, and others (such as multifamily properties) are done using 
an income method.  Thus assessed value may not be a very good proxy for actual sales price.  
Additionally, the study does not carefully define impact areas or divide neighborhoods by 
characteristics.  Thus, other effects that were not calculated might have clouded the impacts of 
the subsidized developments. 
An earlier study by Paul Cummings and John Landis (1993) used a similar 
methodology to measure the impact of CDC-developed subsidized housing around the San 
Francisco Bay Area.  They used actual sales prices, and built a hedonic model using incremental 
distance from the closest development as dependant variables.  The study reported results that 
ranged dramatically, valuing proximity to a development anywhere from -$47,000 to +$78,700.  
Again, these varied results could be explained by the fact that important neighborhood 
characteristics were not taken into account.  They could also be explained by the small sample 
size – in some cases, as few as two sales were used to build the model. 
An interesting 1993 study, by Robert F. Lyons and Scott Loveridge utilizes economic 
utility theory and hedonic modeling to attempt to quantify how much less property owners are 
willing to pay if subsidized housing is near them.  This study acknowledges the limitations on 
previous studies, such as small sample sizes and lack of inclusion of neighborhood effects, and 
incorporates a long list of variables, including house and neighborhood characteristics, as well as 
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characteristics about subsidized housing and its tenants, into a regression analysis.  The study 
concludes that proximity to subsidized housing has a negative impact on price that diminishes as 
distance increases.  The study also looks at subsets of the 25,000 data points to conclude that 
single-family homes are more affected than multifamily buildings.  Interestingly, the study also 
attempts to quantify the impact by type of project (elderly, handicapped, etc) and subsidy 
(Section 8, Section 202, public housing, etc.), although finds no real interpretable conclusions. 
Although this study is an interesting contribution to how subsidized housing might 
contribute to the hedonic formula of house prices in an area, it was not really designed to show 
actual impacts of real developments.  As the study acknowledges, the time that a development 
came into a neighborhood was not taken into account, making it impossible to pinpoint any 
change in perceived utility of specific characteristics to the introduction of subsidized housing.  
Additionally, the incremental price change caused by an additional unit of housing that is 
implied by the regression coefficient does not realistically scale to a multiunit subsidized 
development, and thus may not reflect how surrounding house prices actually behave in the 
presence of that development.  Finally, while the study uses a meticulous method for attempting 
to measure not only distance but special pattern of subsidized housing,  this method relies 
entirely on math and theory rather than actual observations of the neighborhood.  This measure 
may thus over or under represent the importance of proximity to subsidized housing. 
Lee, Culhane, and Wachter (1999) use regression analysis to determine the impact of 
several kinds of subsidized housing on surrounding property values in Philadelphia.  They 
conclude that public housing developments have the most significant negative impact while 
scattered site rental programs like Section 8 have a modest negative impact.  However, they find 
that new construction LIHTC projects and home ownership developments have a positive impact 
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on prices.  While this study does not attempt to look at house prices over time, it does draw 
interesting conclusions about the presence of different types of subsidized housing and its impact 
on neighborhood house values. 
In her 2002 Masters thesis, Emily Weinstein uses a regression analysis and hedonic 
model to build a temporal price index and investigate the specific impact of subsidized housing 
developments on single-family homes in the area.  This study used a carefully designed 
methodology that addressed many of the critiques of the above studies.  The thesis used a 
hedonic model and descriptive statistics to build price indices over time in both the impact and 
control areas.  The study looked at sales prices during the period before, during, and after the 
project was introduced in order to isolate the effect of the development on prices in the impact 
zone as much as possible.  This thesis concluded that the subsidized developments did not cause 
any significant negative impact on prices of nearby single-family homes.  
In their 2004 Masters thesis, David Ritchay and Zoë Weinrobe investigated the 
impact of nine high-density, mixed-income developments built under Massachusetts Chapter 
40B statute on surrounding single-family home values.  In addition to using a similar 
methodology to Weinstein’s study, the researchers took extensive measures to define their 
impact zones accurately, using aerial photos and site visits to determine the realistic impact zone 
for each project.  This study found no significant negative impact of large-scale 40B projects on 
surrounding single-family home prices. 
 
Other Studies 
 There have been few studies worth mentioning that look beyond affordability to 
investigate the impacts of multifamily developments on surrounding home prices.  At the very 
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crude end of the spectrum is a 2004 impact study undertaken at the behest of the developer of a 
proposed multifamily project in Mountain View, California (Strategic Economics).  The report 
was commissioned to address (and assuage) property value concerns raised by the community 
abutting the new development.  In the study, roughly equivalent existing multifamily 
developments in the area were chosen as case studies, and the trend in median sales prices (per 
square foot) of single family homes in an impact zone around the multifamily project before and 
after it was built were measured.  In all cases, the impact zone showed an appreciation in sales 
prices that continued during and after construction of the multifamily project. 
The obvious weaknesses were identified by the City of Mountain View, which noted that 
the report lacked information about property value changes citywide.  Obviously, without this 
comparison, it is impossible to determine if prices in the impact zone were affected relative to 
prices elsewhere in the city.  I would add to the critique the simplicity of using median sales 
prices as a measure.  This discounts all other characteristics of the house and the neighborhood 
that might make prices rise or fall and fails to isolate the development as the cause of the sales 
trends.   There is simply no evidence in this report that the trend in sales prices had anything to 
do with the development.    
Nonetheless, this study did do two things well.  First of all, the study tracked price trend 
before and after the development was built, in order to assess the impact of the development on 
the surrounding area.  Secondly, the authors seem to have thought about the “impact zone” 
chosen for each case.  Every case had a different area identified by precise geographic borders 
determined by neighborhood definitions.  This study also provides an interesting lesson in using 
econometric measures as a way to persuade a community. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
 In this thesis, I utilized a rigorous process to identify appropriate case developments for 
the research and to determine accurate impact zones for each case study.   I then used a thorough 
quantitative methodology established in previous studies to create a hedonic price model and 
build a sales price index for each case study.  By comparing the price trend in the impact and 
control areas in each case, I could assess the effect of the multifamily development on prices of 
nearby single-family homes. 
 
Case Selection Criteria and Resources 
I used several criteria in order to narrow down and select the developments that I chose as 
case studies. Of the hundreds of towns and thousands of potential developments in the Greater 
Boston Area, I expected to have a bounty of appropriate case studies from which to choose.  In 
fact, over the course of my research, I found no examples of developments that met all of my 
criteria.  Rather than having to narrow my search, I actually had to expand it, digging through 
many lists of subsidized, transit-oriented, and controversial residential projects.  At the end of the 
process, I found five developments that represent some of my criteria and are imperfect though 
interesting examples. 
The purpose of my thesis is to extend the knowledge about housing in the Greater Boston 
Area so I started with a geographic restriction.  I only considered towns within the Interstate 495 
loop.  This area is generally considered to be the Greater Boston Area, and has many towns that 
are bedroom communities for Boston.  Additionally, the Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority 
(MBTA) commuter rail system covers much of this area, making the option for development 
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near mass transit as likely as possible.  Finally, this geographic area is influenced by a largely 
similar real estate market and similar demographic and macroeconomic trends.   
Beyond geography, I had several other criteria for potential case studies.  First of all, as I 
explained in the introduction, because of anti-development zoning and community opposition, 
larger-scale multifamily residential building has all but stopped in many towns in the Greater 
Boston Area.  Therefore, I wanted to focus on relatively large multifamily developments that 
were noticeably distinct in size and density than the rest of the housing in the town.  For 
example, the smallest case study development, Oak Hill, in Ipswich, contains 33 units.  In a rural 
town with almost exclusively single-family homes, this development represents something 
noticeably different.  In addition, I wanted to find developments that had been built with an 
intentional affordability component, whether by a statutory requirement (such as 40B) or not.  
Finally, because of the temporal coverage of the data that I used, I restricted the search for 
developments completed between 1989 and 2004.   
I also wanted to use developments that reflect some of the principles that are currently in 
vogue in planning literature and touted by officials at the state level.  In their 2004 Masters 
thesis, David Ritchay and Zoë Weinrobe undertook a similar study of large 40B developments.  
They found that more often than not, these large-scale, heavily subsidized developments were 
situated in isolated areas far from existing infrastructure, transit, and other development.  They 
were found in the shadow of the highway, next to the train tracks (but not the train station), and 
in other areas with as little other development as possible.  I set out to find examples of Smart 
Growth developments - dense, multifamily, mixed-income, mixed-use housing projects built in 
town centers and close to mass transit.  I was looking for developments that are within walking 
distance of a commuter rail or rapid transit node and close to retail or commercial development.  
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With these criteria, I expected to find developments that mirrored not only currently popular 
planning principles, but also the typology of the traditional New England compact town center.  
I used several resources to find cases.  I started out with the Citizen’s Housing and 
Planning Association (CHAPA)’s  most recent list of 40B developments,1 over 500 
developments around the state that were built through the comprehensive permit process and 
contain subsidized units.  All of these contain at least 20 percent affordable units, and most are 
large-scale projects.  Unfortunately, as mentioned before, the vast majority of these 
developments were constructed before my cut off of 1988, and were in inappropriate locations.  
In looking through this list, I eliminated any developments that were in towns without a 
commuter rail station or that were more than a ten-minute walk from a transit station and from a 
commercial area.  I also used lists of subsidized apartment complexes around the state,2 another 
500 or so developments that contain income-restricted units.  Again, almost all of these were 
built before 1985 with federal programs that are long gone.  I also used examples from a 2004 
paper by James O’Connell.3  In his paper, O’Connell profiled several towns in the Greater 
Boston Area and their progress in the area of transit-oriented development.  He mentioned many 
developments that had been built around MBTA transit stations.  By comparing these to other 
resources I narrowed down the list to developments around transit that met my other criteria.  In 
the end, I found five case studies that tell three different tales of multifamily development in the 
Greater Boston Area.   
As part of the case selection process, I visited about 50 developments in order to assess 
their appropriateness as a case study.  In each case that I chose, I conducted interviews with 
municipal employees familiar with the development.  In most cases this was a town planner, 
although I also spoke to volunteer town committee members and retired employees.  The focus 
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of these interviews was to gather information about the development and the nature of the 
permitting process.   In each case, I researched the town’s response to 40B and its planning 
efforts around housing.  I also interviewed the developer of each case project.   Finally, I made 
repeated visits to each case site in order to collect visual information, investigate the 
development, and determine impact zones.  During each visit, I attempted (with limited success) 
to canvass neighbors and town residents about the impact of the development on the community, 
 
Impact Zones 
The fundamental question of my thesis is whether multifamily residential developments 
affect the prices of nearby single-family homes.  However, the term “nearby” is a simplification 
of my question and of the nature of neighborhoods, particularly in smaller towns.  Simple 
distance from the development is rarely an accurate proxy for impact area.  In reality, 
neighborhoods are determined by street patterns, topography and sight lines, and natural and 
manmade edges, such as rivers, train tracks, and highways.  Residents may be more significantly 
impacted by a development a half-mile away on a previously virgin hillside than by one two lots 
away behind a large commercial building.  A larger development will have a different impact 
zone than a smaller one, and a neighborhood with an existing mix of uses, including other 
multifamily projects would probably have a different definition of impact than a homogeneous 
area of freestanding single-family homes.   
I used several criteria, listed in Table 3.1, to identify the impact zone of each 
development and to make sure that the zone was defined conservatively and accurately.  Homes 
that met at least one of my basic criteria were considered to be in the impact zone.  The criteria 
include: if the development is visually obvious from a home, if a single-family home shares 
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roads or other pathways with the development, or if the development is on the way to the town 
center or commuter rail stop from a home.  Often natural or manmade physical barriers such as 
train tracks, rivers, or highways defined edges of the impact zone, while in other cases, distance 
or street patterns created the border of the zone.  In each case, the criteria for the impact zone 
was slightly different, and each zone is described in more detail in the Chapter 5.   
Table 3.1: Impact zone assessment criteria 
Criteria Include if 
Distance - No set distance, although maximum case is about 800 meters  
Visual - Home has direct site line to development 
- Development is in visually obvious point in neighborhood, like on a hill 
Traffic Patterns - Development is between house and main road, town center, or other 
main destination 
- Development is on pedestrian access point, for example, contiguous to 
local park 
Edges - Natural barrier such as river, forest, hill blocks sight lines or traffic flow 
- Manmade barrier such as another large development 
- Large roads, train tracks, other edges 
 
I found that trying to quantify the impact zone for developments with proximity to train 
stations or town centers is particularly difficult.  As opposed to a large residential 40B 
development that is built in the middle of an entirely single-family neighborhood, the cases that I 
found were all in fairly heterogeneous areas.   In all of my cases, I found that the impact zones 
were smaller than I expected due to preexisting non-residential uses in the neighborhood.  For 
example, the examples at transit nodes were in neighborhoods already impacted by the train 
tracks, while the cases that are close to mixed-use areas are surrounded by single-family homes 
that are already near other traditionally “incompatible uses.”  
I finalized the impact zone for each development through examination of maps and aerial 
photos of the towns, visits to the site, and discussion with local residents and town officials. 
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Quantitative Analysis 
My initial task was to use sales transaction records to build a strong hedonic price model 
that incorporates house characteristics and transaction dates to explain the observed sales prices.  
After that, I used this model to examine the price trend of a theoretical “average house” over 
time.  Finally, I compared the house price index in the area impacted by the case study 
development to the rest of the town in the time immediately around the completion of the project 
to see what, if any, impact on prices the development had.   By using a strict impact and control 
area, and building a price model over time, this method allows the impact of the development to 
be isolated as clearly as possible as the cause of any change in sales prices. 
 
Data  
For my analysis, I used single-family home sales transaction data collected by The 
Warren Group.4  The data set includes all of the transactions in a town from 1988 through early 
2005, and has information in each record such as the seller and buyer, sales price, mortgage 
amount, and date of sale.  The data set also contains information about the house, such as square 
footage, lot size, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, fireplaces, etc.  For each case study, I 
analyzed all of the single-family sales transactions in the town from 1988 to the present. 
The quality of the Warren Group’s data is only as good as the public record, and in some 
cases, the data sets included quite a few imperfect or suspicious records.  In each data set, I 
found records with incomplete information, such as missing values for square footage or year 
that the house was built.  I eliminated all incomplete records from the analysis.  In addition, the 
majority of the records in the data set for Canton contained a “0” value for the number of 
bedrooms.  As I explain in my analysis, I decided to use the “Total Rooms” values in Canton 
instead of the number of bedrooms. 
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In order to make sure that I was using as accurate a data set as possible, I endeavored to 
remove suspicious data from each set before running my analyses.   In each case, I excluded 
records that did not seem to be legitimate arms-length transactions, for example those with sales 
prices of $1 or properties that changed hands twice in one day.  I also removed transactions that 
had extreme values that I interpreted as outliers (for example a $57 million sales price), records 
that indicated mortgage amounts higher than the sales price, and records with other suspicious 
data that I investigated through The Warren Group’s full property information online database.  
After an initial cleaning of the records, I ran descriptive statistics and created scatter plots to 
visually represent each data set and look for outliers or other suspicious records.  This 
occasionally led to the elimination of other suspicious transactions, for example, lot sizes listed 
as several hundred acres or huge homes on impossibly small lots. Appendix 3.1 shows the total 
number of records used and eliminated for each case.  In most of the data sets, the total number 
of outlying or suspicious records was between 0.1 and 4.9 percent. 
 
Hedonic Model 
The process of hedonic modeling of house prices has been described in great detail in 
other places, including in several papers referenced in the bibliography and in the 2004 thesis by 
David Ritchay and Zoë Weinrobe.  Therefore, I will limit my discussion here to a brief overview.   
The theory of hedonic modeling for home prices assumes that consumers value houses as 
a “bundle of goods” that includes attributes about the home itself (such as house size, lot size, 
number of bedrooms, etc.) and characteristics of the neighborhood (such as real and perceived 
crime rates, tax rates, and quality of the local schools).  By identifying these attributes and their 
contribution to the overall price, we can build a model that explains the house price (or 
dependant variable) as a constant (α) added to a series of components: 
 35
Price  =  α + β1(characteristic 1) + β2(characteristic 2) + β3(characteristic 3) … 
 
In each component, the coefficient (βx) explains the influence of that particular characteristic on 
the overall price of the house.  For example, if the coefficient for a characteristic like “garage” is 
8%, then a house with a garage would cost 8% more than a house without a garage, assuming all 
other characteristics about the house are the same.  
 There are two types of attributes, or variables: continuous and discrete.  Continuous 
variables can have any one of a range of values.  For example, the interior square footage of a 
house can be anything from a few hundred square feet to tens of thousands of square feet.  
Discrete variables can only have a yes/no definition.  For example, a house either has a pool or it 
doesn’t.  In order to express discrete characteristics of the houses in the model, I created a series 
of dummy variables that were either turned on (a 1 value) or off (a 0 value).  For example, for the 
characteristic “number of bedrooms,” I could create a series of dummy variables, “1BR,” “2BR,” 
“3BR,” 4+BR.”  Each record would be assigned a “1” value for the appropriate dummy variable, 
and “0” values for the other dummy variables.  In each group of dummy variables, the lowest, or 
base case is left out of the model.  In my models, the base case represents the minimum scenario, 
and the coefficients in the model describe the increase in price caused by the add-on represented 
by the other dummy variables.  For example, it is assumed that a house with no garage is the 
base case, and the dummy variables of “1-car,” “2-car,” etc. can be used to describe garage 
configurations.  The coefficients related to these dummy variables would explain the positive (or 
possibly negative) impact that different garage types has on sales prices, assuming all other 
characteristics about the house are the same.   Although we sometimes assume that with houses 
more is more, by looking at the coefficients of the model we can quickly see the positive or 
negative tradeoffs that different characteristics have on house prices. 
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In addition, some attributes, such as having a garage, might be highly valued by potential 
buyers and therefore have a large impact on sales price, while others, such as the type of heat 
system, might have a negligible impact.  A good hedonic model includes as many of the strongly 
determinative factors as possible, but does not clutter the results with factors that do not 
significantly affect the price.  The strength of the model is indicated by the R-squared value, 
which indicates approximately what amount of the dependent variable (sales price) is being 
explained by the independent variables (attributes of the house).  The higher model’s R-squared 
value, the better the explanatory power of the model. 
In this thesis, I focus on attributes of the house and its lot.  Typical neighborhood 
characteristics should not be important in my model, since all of the homes are in the same town 
(thus are similarly affected by local factors such as property tax rate and school quality, as well 
as macroeconomic real estate trends).  Thus the main factors that will determine sales prices are 
the attributes of the house and lot that are available in The Warren Group data. 
 
Sales Price Index 
In order to measure the impact of the case study development on surrounding single-
family house prices, I created a house price index for both the impact area and the control (the 
rest of the town).  For each case study, I examined descriptive statistics about the data set to 
determine the attributes of a theoretical “average house.”5   This average house differs between 
the impact and control areas, as determined by the types of houses in each data set.  An equation, 
using coefficients derived from the hedonic model, is employed to price the theoretical average 
house at the base time (1987 or 1987-88 for all of my cases).  The coefficient for each non-base 
sales year(s) is then added to the base year sales price to create a price index of this average 
house over time.  This method uses the power of the hedonic model, which explains how actual 
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prices from the data sample were affected by year of sale, to apply to the theoretical average 
house as if it had sold in each year.  Thus I could compare the price movement of an average 
house in the impact zone to an average house elsewhere in the town from 1988 to the present. 
In each town, I was particularly interested in looking at the years during and after the 
permitting and construction of the case study development.  Therefore, though I measured a sales 
price index for the duration of the available data, it is the years around each project on which I 
focus. This method assumes that news about real estate development becomes public knowledge 
during the permitting process, and that the development continues to impact sales prices as it is 
constructed and leased up/sold.  Any impact to surrounding home prices might begin as early as 
when the neighbors first heard about the development and decide to sell their home, and continue 
as long as the development is seen as having an impact on the community.  Though these are the 
general parameters that I used, I argue that like physical impact zones, this time window differs 
by the size and type of development.  The specific justification for each time window is 
described in the results for each case study.   
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Partial lists of 40B projects were obtained from both the Citizen’s Housing and Planning Association and from the 
Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development.  Although both organizations have the 
responsibility to oversee units restricted by federal subsidies and monitor expiring use projects, amazingly neither 
seems to have a complete list of all projects permitted through the 40B process. 
2 Massachusetts Projects with Subsidized Mortgages or HUD Project-Based Rental Assistance, Citizen’s Housing 
and Planning Association, 2004, http://www.chapa.org/expiringuse2004.pdf and Affordable Housing Online, 
website of apartment complexes that include subsidized units, 
http://www.affordablehousingonline.com/apartments.asp?mnuState=MA. 
3 O’Connell, James C. Ahead or Behind the Curve?: Compact, Mixed-Use Development in Suburban Boston, 
August, 2004, http://www.massapa.org/pdf/report_aheadbehindcurve.pdf 
4 A complete description of the data can be found on The Warren Group’s website.  “About our Data,” The Warren 
Group, http://rers.thewarrengroup.com/sor/help/aboutourdata.asp 
5 The equation for the average house includes all of the variables that were used to build the hedonic model and 
looks something like: 
Price = constant + β1(average lot size for the sample) + β2(average interior square footage for the 
sample) + β3(% of houses with 2BR) + β4(% of houses with 3BR) + β5(% of houses with 4+BR) 
+…+ βx-1(% of houses built from 1980-1991) + βx(% of houses built after 1991) 
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY PROFILES 
 
 I chose five developments in towns around the Boston area as case studies.  The cases 
represent different strategies that towns have used to provide housing options: age- restricted 
 
Figure 4.1: Greater Boston Area and five Case Study Towns 
 
developments, 40B mixed-income 
developments, and rezoning to 
allow for more housing production.  
Although no case met all of the 
criteria that I initially established, 
each has key characteristics.  See 
Appendix 4.1 for statistics about 
the five towns and Appendix 4.2 
for general information about the 
five case study developments. 
 
Scenario 1: Age-restricted Residential Projects 
In the course of investigating potential case studies I discovered one boom area of 
residential construction: age-restricted housing.  Elderly developments pose little threat of 
additional school children to add to the local school system and drivers to add to traffic and 
parking burdens.  Accordingly, towns see age-restricted housing as a relatively painless way for 
them to meet their ten percent 40B requirement.  Many towns are encouraging larger, mixed-
income or affordable elderly projects within their boundaries, even rezoning parts of town for 
age-restricted development or cooperating with developers who want to use the comprehensive 
permit process for age-restricted projects. 
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I decided to acknowledge the age-restricted housing trend by choosing two senior 
developments as case studies.  Both of these were completed with the cooperation of the 
municipality, and to all accounts met with little objection from town residents.  One (Ipswich) 
used the 40B process while the other (Reading) went through the local permitting process.  Both 
developments are located near retail areas and relatively close to the commuter rail.  
 
Case 1: Longwood Place at Reading 
Town Profile 
 With a population of almost 24,000, Reading is a relatively large town.   Only 12 miles 
north of Boston, Reading lies on both Interstate 93 and 95 and has an MBTA commuter rail 
station.  Reading is undergoing changes, with two large residential and mixed-use developments 
under construction in the area adjacent to the commuter rail station.  However, these projects 
have come to Reading through the 40B process, and it is only now that the town is 
acknowledging its potential for transit-oriented development. 
Reading’s residential zoning primarily requires single-family development on minimum 
lot sizes from 15,000 square feet to an acre.  The current zoning ordinance does incorporate 
inclusionary requirements in its municipal reuse district and its planned unit development (PUD) 
and planned residential development (PRD) bylaws.1  In one particularly Machiavellian section 
of the PRD bylaw, the zoning requires at least ten percent of the units are affordable, 15% if the 
site is within 300 feet of the town line.  Currently, Reading has about 7.9% of its units counted as 
affordable, and is about 450 units short of the ten percent 40B requirement. 
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Planning Efforts 
Reading’s new Community Development Plan begins with the objective: “Preserve the 
architectural heritage and the traditional village character of the Town” and follows with an 
ominous first goal: “Preserve the Town as a primarily single-family, owner-occupied residential 
community.2”  However, the recent approval of several 40B projects comprising over 500 units 
throughout Reading has forced the town to undertake proactive housing planning.  The new 
Community Development plan includes a list of housing initiatives from adopting inclusionary 
zoning to reforming a housing committee, to hiring a housing staff person.   The plan also 
includes a specific proposal to rezone downtown districts for mixed-use development.  However, 
the town’s lack of staff and financial resources make concrete progress difficult.  According to a 
member of the planning staff, the town has been in the position of reacting to 40B developments 
instead of having the ability to control the development process from the outset. 
 
Development Profile 
Longwood Place at Reading is a privately-owned, for-profit assisted living facility that is     
Figure 3.2: Longwood Place at Reading 
 
Photo by Stephen Sette-Ducati, courtesy of Longwood Place 
 
age restricted to residents 55 and older.  
The facility consists of 86 units, 80% of 
which are market rate and 20% of which 
are restricted to residents at or below 50% 
of area median income.  The development 
has a mixed-use component, with a dance 
school and civic space within the 
building.  The development includes the 
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Figure 3.3: Aerial view surrounded by single-family homes 
 
 
reuse of an existing building and new 
construction that more than doubled the 
built square footage on the site. 
Longwood Place was conceived in 1993, 
permitted in 1994, and opened in 1996.  
The developer did not utilize the 40B 
comprehensive permit option, but went 
through the local permitting process.  At 
86 units and a density of almost 18 units 
per acre, Longwood Place stands out in  
Reading and particularly in its neighborhood, which is primarily single-family homes.  
Longwood Place is just over a kilometer from Reading’s commuter rail station, and about 300 
meters from the closest commercial district. 
The developer of Longwood Place specializes in senior living facilities and has been 
involved with seven 40B developments around the state.  In Reading, the developer recognized 
that seniors were being priced out of their homes and realized that assisted living facilities could 
help this population stay local as they aged.  There were several reasons that the developer chose 
to go through the local permitting process rather than via a comprehensive permit.  At the time 
the process was started the site was located in a Municipal Building Reuse overlay district, a 
designation that allows for significant dimensional flexibility.  Reading also had a clearly defined 
process for acquiring the required permits to build in the zone.  As a result, the developers did 
not have to go to Town Meeting to seek a rezoning of the site, an arduous and high-risk task. 
Additionally, the developers were willing to meet several other requirements of the town, 
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including surpassing the inclusionary zoning requirement of the Municipal Building Reuse 
district,3 retaining a commercial tenant (the dance school) on site, and incorporating civic uses 
both within the building and on the property. 
The developers did require three variances for the project: a reduction of minimum 
parking spaces, relief from side-yard setback requirements, and an exception to the requirements 
regarding overall building size and massing.4  Two of these permits were appealed: the side yard 
variance by an abutter and the special permit by the Reading Housing Authority.  The developers 
negotiated with the abutter and changed the design of the building slightly, whereupon the appeal 
was dropped.  The Reading Housing Authority appealed over the supervision of the affordable 
units, a responsibility they believed the zoning bylaws designated to them.  The situation was 
resolved when the Housing Authority, the Board of Selectmen, and the developer signed a three-
way agreement requiring the owners of Longwood Place to certify that at least half of the 
affordable units would be rented to residents with Reading ties in perpetuity.   
Although the Reading permitting process was straightforward, the developer wonders if 
Longwood Place would have been smoother as a 40B project.  However, the developer 
remembers that the Reading Board of Selectmen made it clear that they strongly preferred that 
the project go through town channels.  As a result, 40B helped the process because both the 
developer and the town knew that it could be used if necessary, and both parties were 
encouraged to support and move Longwood Place forward. 
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Case 2: Oak Hill 
Town Profile 
 Ipswich is a small rural town of about 12,000 people on the North Shore of 
Massachusetts about 28 miles northeast of Boston.  It is known for its extensive protected open 
space and its large, well-preserved collection of historic homes.5  The town has a compact center 
with an MBTA commuter rail stop.  Originally a working mill town, Ipswich became a summer 
retreat for families from Boston and its environs.  Today, Ipswich is primarily a bedroom 
community to Boston.  In the 2000 census, the median household income of Ipswich was 
$57,284, slightly lower than the Boston metropolitan area median.  Although not particularly 
affluent, household incomes have increased considerably in Ipswich over the last decade, 
indicating that the wealthy population is growing in the town.  Simultaneously, the demographics 
of Ipswich have shifted, with middle-aged families replacing young adults and the elderly.6  
These trends might in part be explained by the town’s booming real estate market.  In the last 
decade, the sales price of the median single-family home in Ipswich increased by 175%.7  In 
addition, many homes that were being used as second or vacation homes have changed to 
primary residences, indicating Ipswich’s growing popularity as a place to call home. 
Construction trends in town have favored the single-family home, with the number of 
single-family units growing between 1990 and 2000.  As elsewhere in Massachusetts, houses are 
getting larger in Ipswich, and new eight and nine-room homes are common.  Meanwhile, the 
number of multifamily structures (with three or more units) fell as a percent of total housing 
units in Ipswich over the same decade.  The construction of rental housing has been particularly 
sluggish. In fact, the town had fewer rental units in 2000 than it did in 1990.8  As of early 2005, 
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7.8% of the town’s housing units were considered affordable, just over 100 units short of the 40B 
ten percent goal.9  According to CHAPA, this number changed by less than 1% since 1997.10  
 Ipswich’s zoning reflects its rural nature.  Approximately 93% of the land in Ipswich is 
designated as one of three “Rural Residential Zones” (RRZ), which have a minimum lot size of 
two acres.  These zones allow single-family homes by right and two-family homes by special 
permit.  Around the town center, approximately 2.2% of the town’s land is zoned as “Intown 
Residential” (IR), where single- and two-family homes are allowed by right, multifamily is 
allowed by special permit, and minimum lot sizes are 10,000 square feet and up.11  The town’s 
recent efforts to promote housing development have focused on this IR district. 
 
Planning Efforts 
 Ipswich’s zoning bylaw and its housing plan are oriented toward protecting open space 
and preserving the rural character of the town, but planning officials maintain that the town is 
committed to increasing the production of affordable housing.  Ipswich has recently taken 
several steps to encourage housing starts.  The 2003 Housing Action Plan outlines four policy 
areas and thirteen distinct actions to move Ipswich closer to the ten percent goal.  The plan 
suggests creating a new Village Incentive District (VI), to encourage higher densities in 
developed areas and to take advantage of existing infrastructure.  Under this proposal, up to four-
unit residential buildings could be built in the VI district on smaller lots than currently allowed in 
the zoning ordinance.  The plan suggests using a transfer of development rights to increase 
allowable densities in this district while preserving undeveloped land in rural districts.   
Although many of the proposals in the plan, including the VI district, have yet to be 
passed, Ipswich has been able to take a few concrete actions.  For example, zoning has twice 
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been amended (in 1999 and in 2001) to allow for the creation of small accessory units in 
preexisting residential buildings or in secondary structures on residential lots.  In 2003, Town 
Meeting passed an amendment to the zoning bylaw that allows infill development of housing on 
non-conforming (too small) lots in the Intown Residence district.   The town has also enacted an 
inclusionary zoning provision that grants developers density bonuses by special permit if they 
make a minimum of ten percent of the units affordable (to households at 70% of area median 
income).  Planning staff explain that the provision is intended to encourage more projects to go 
through the local process instead of the comprehensive permit alternative, and notes that three 
projects have been approved in the year and a half since the provision was enacted.   
The town has participated in three recent comprehensive permit projects that are 
described as amicable and that were done with the cooperation of the town and minimal 
opposition from abutters and residents. 
 
Development Profile 
Oak Hill is a 33-unit rental housing development that is 100% affordable to residents at 
up to 80% of area median income. It was built as congregate housing and is age-restricted to 
elderly members of the community.  The project was developed by the Immanuel Baptist 
Church, which donated the land and raised the majority of the money for development.  The 
development is situated in the heart of downtown Ipswich, on one of the main commercial 
streets, less than a half a mile from the MBTA commuter rail station.  One member of Immanuel 
involved with the development of Oak Hill remembers that the needs of the elderly residents 
were a critical factor in situating the project.  While seniors were less likely to utilize proximity 
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Figure 3.4: The Oak Hill development  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Central Street, Ipswich 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Aerial view surrounded by single-family homes  
 
 
to the commuter rail, they could access 
retail easily and did not need to drive to 
get out and take care of their daily needs.  
The development is surrounded on three 
sides with single-family residences.  Oak 
Hill was one of the first larger 
multifamily projects in town, and it is 
still one of the densest.  
Oak Hill did require and receive a 
comprehensive permit.  The church went 
through the 40B process because the 
project needed a variance and relief from 
the density restrictions of the Ipswich 
zoning ordinance, something that the 
town’s Zoning Board of Appeals had not 
previously encountered.  There was little 
community opposition to the project.  In 
fact, many community leaders joined the 
Oak Hill Board during the development 
process.  The project progressed 
smoothly, and was approved in 1988 and 
completed in late 1989. 
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In 2004, Oak Hill added another seven units in an adjacent city-owned building, the 
Memorial Hall.  The Memorial Hall project also sought a comprehensive permit in order to get 
relief from density limits.  Ipswich planning staff referred to the process as a “friendly 40B” and 
stressed that the expansion received little community opposition.   
 
 
 
Scenario 2: Recent 40B Residential Projects 
In the past few years, the number of 40B projects completed in the Greater Boston Area 
has picked up after a decade of sluggish activity.  In fact, the total number of 40B developments 
approved has increased by almost 15% since the beginning of 2003.12  According to CHAPA, 
this upsurge has been fueled by the area’s skyrocketing real estate market.  Developers are 
finding that residential development in the suburbs is extremely lucrative, even with the 
affordability requirements of 40B.  The comprehensive permit process has proven to be a reliable 
alternative to the messy local process, and developers are turning to it in increasing numbers. 
In many recent 40B projects, the permitting process is more of a negotiation between the 
town and the developer than a hostile course of action.  With the state Housing Appeals 
Committee’s record of ruling in the developer’s favor in two-thirds of 40B appeals,13 perhaps 
towns realize that their best chance of maintaining control of the project is through an active 
dialogue with the developer.  Two of the case studies that I chose are just such developments.  
Though both are large projects that probably would not have been built without 40B, both were 
developed with the cooperation of the town. 
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Case 3: The Woodlands at Abington Station 
Town Profile 
 Originally a manufacturing community, today Abington describes itself as a small 
bedroom community to Boston.  Abington is not a particularly wealthy suburb, with a median 
household income slightly below the Boston metropolitan area median.  However, this town of 
12,000 has seen astronomical real estate appreciation, with the median single-family home price 
increasing over 250% in the last decade.  This boom, spurred in part by the new commuter rail 
stop, which opened in 1997, has left residents worried about growth and local officials 
scrambling to proactively plan for the community’s future development. 
Abington’s housing production has followed state trends, with a decrease in building 
permits issued of over 30% in the 1990s.  At an average of 42 permits per year, new production 
was not able to keep up with demand.14  However, Abington has seen increased multifamily 
permitting in the past three years, and has been the location of several recent large 40B projects.  
Because of this, the town been able to greatly increase its inventory of affordable units.  
According to DHCD, in 2002 Abington had 4.7% affordable units.  In 2003, Abington added 32 
affordable ownership and 181 affordable rental units to its inventory,15 leaving the town just 535 
units short of ten percent goal.16
 
Planning Efforts 
Like many towns, Abington has been focused on relieving the requirements of 40B, and 
the town has been aggressive in proactively planning for housing production in recent years. The 
town has focused its efforts on getting a Planned Production Plan (PPP) approved by the 
Department of Housing and Community Development.  The PPP outlines how the town will 
produce the minimum requirement of three-quarters of a percent of affordable units per year for 
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the next five years. As of 2005, Abington is one of only 29 towns that has a PPP approved by the 
DHCD.  The plan counts two 40B projects, including The Woodlands, as contributing to its 
annual addition of affordable units.  At 40 units per year, the 192 units at The Woodlands alone 
nearly achieves Abington’s 0.75% goal. 
 Abington has also been proactive in its outlook for future development, and the town has 
been repeatedly recognized for its approach to growth.  In 2003, Abington Town Meeting voted 
to rezone two areas to encourage multi-family residential development.  The first, the Central 
Business District (CBD), allows for both the creation of accessory units and higher-density 
multifamily structures.  The second, the Transit Oriented Development (TOD) Zone, won the 
Governor’s Smart Growth Leadership Award in December of 2004.17  The district, which 
comprises 30 acres around the commuter rail station, encourages mixed-use development and 
incorporates features such as reduced parking ratios and required pedestrian connections to the 
train station.  In a 2004 audit, Abington was recognized by the Massachusetts Vision 2020 as one 
of only three communities out of the 42 studied that are currently “growing smartly.18” 
 According to Abington planning staff, The Woodlands development was the impetus for 
the rezoning proposals.  The town wanted to be able to control the rate and form of development 
in these areas, and the rezoning was an attempt to do that.  While the original intent of the TOD 
district was to encourage business development around the train station, planning staff points to 
The Woodlands as an example of the success of dense residential development in that area. 
 
Development Profile 
The Woodlands at Abington Station is a 192-unit rental property developed by Beacon 
Residential Properties.  The project was permitted through the comprehensive permit process and 
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includes 20 percent (39 units) affordable to households at or below 50% of area median income.  
The development is unique for Abington in its scale, its mix of one-bedroom and two-bedroom  
Figure 3.7: The Woodlands at Abington Station 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Aerial view with nearby single-family homes 
 
apartments, and its density of 9.6 units 
per buildable acre.  The development 
was permitted in 2001 and completed 
in early 2003. 
While The Woodlands is not in 
the town center of Abington, it is 
adjacent to the commuter rail station.  
This proximity was used by Beacon in 
both selling the development to the 
town and in subsequent marketing of 
the units to potential residents.  It was 
also promoted by the town, which 
submitted the project for a Smart 
Growth award in 2004.19  The 
Woodlands was built on a redeveloped 
paintball course site and utilized 
existing water and sewer infrastructure. 
Beacon intended to go through 40B from the outset of the project, realizing that the 
comprehensive permit process was the most straightforward way to proceed.  At that time, the 
property was zoned for industrial use, and Beacon would have been required to request a 
rezoning in Town Meeting.  A former Beacon employee involved in the development notes that 
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it would have been very difficult getting public support for a residential project of that size and 
adds that going to Town Meeting for the rezoning would have been an extremely expensive and 
high-risk process. 
 Abington worked with Beacon throughout the project, trying to negotiate the best deal 
possible for the town while ensuring that the permitting process moved forward.  The town was 
particularly motivated to ensure the permit approval for The Woodlands because the 192 rental 
units would get Abington to the ten percent 40B requirement.   Although the scale and tenure of 
the project and its traffic impacts were of some concern to the neighbors, as was water supply 
and sewage capacity, public resistance to the project was never very great.  This was in part 
because the residential development was an improvement over the former industrial use.  
Overall, The Woodlands permitting process was non-adversarial and successful largely due to 
the negotiation between the developer and the town.  The former Beacon employee concluded 
that without 40B, they wouldn’t have had a chance of getting a development of that size 
approved in Abington, or in any other town in the area. 
 
Case 4: Fairhaven Garden 
Town Profile 
One of the wealthiest and most expensive towns in the Greater Boston Area, Concord had 
a 2004 average single-family home value of $898,455.20  At almost $100,000, the town’s median 
household income is 167% of the Greater Boston Area’s. 
Concord suffers from the anti-development trend that is facing towns in the region.  
Construction of new homes is almost non-existent in the town.  In the past ten years, Concord 
has granted just 306 residential building permits, with only two of these (both 40B projects) for 
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multifamily structures.21  Even the trickle of new single-family permits cannot truly be 
considered new construction, since an average of two-thirds of the single-family permits every 
year are for teardowns.22 In practice, teardowns are used to replace smaller homes with large new 
houses, often combining lots (and thus reducing overall density) in the process.  Concord’s 
housing stock reflects this trend, with the average size of a new house increasing from 3,123 
square feet in 1980 to 8,995 square feet in 2000.23
Over half of Concord’s land is designated as preserved open space, and the town’s 
remaining developable land is almost entirely zoned for single-family homes with one- or two- 
acre minimum lot sizes.  Ironically, much of Concord’s appeal is its traditional New England 
town feel, with businesses and residences crowded around the town common, a typology that is 
found around the West Concord town center.  However, this traditional form is impossible to 
recreate under Concord’s current zoning and building trends. 
As of August of 2004, Concord had only reached 4.92% affordable units, far short of the 
40B ten percent requirement and the lowest of any of the case study towns.24  The town has seen 
only four developments with an affordability component since 2000.  Two were small (a total of 
17 homes) single-family home ownership projects undertaken by the Concord Housing Trust and 
a non-profit developer, and two were 40B rental projects.25  The town submitted a Planned 
Production plan to the DHCD in 2004 and is waiting for it to be approved. 
 
Planning Efforts 
A review of Concord’s pertinent planning documents indicates that affordable housing is 
not a high priority for the town.  While affordable housing is mentioned repeatedly in Concord’s 
zoning bylaws, there is no specific requirement or incentive for developers to incorporate an 
 53
affordability component.  The town’s 2004 Affordable Housing Fact sheet points out (perhaps 
ironically?26) that Concord is “somewhat unique” in including households with up to 150% of 
the area median income (currently almost $125,000 for a family of four) in its affordable housing 
designation.  In fact, the town’s zoning includes two levels of affordability, “starter units,” for 
households up to 110% of area median income, and “moderately priced units,” for households up 
to 150%.27   Both the Planned Residential Bylaw and the Residential Cluster Development 
sections of the town’s zoning ordinance28 allow a density bonus for developments that include 
units at or below these affordability levels.  However, in both cases, the bonus is undefined and 
is granted at the discretion of the Planning Board.  
In 1992, Concord passed an Inclusionary Housing Bylaw that requires all large 
subdivisions to set aside land for the construction of affordable units or to donate funds for the 
offsite production of affordable units.  This has not proven to be efficacious in actually getting 
units constructed, as the market rate for units is so high in the area that developers can easily 
contribute the cash equivalent and avoid incorporating affordability into their project.   An 
example of this is Concord Crossing, a new mixed-use redevelopment of an industrial site across 
from the Concord Center commuter rail station.  The project includes 20 rental units, and was 
granted a special permit and density variance.  Although the developer initially planned to 
include two affordable units in the project, he decided to take the offsite payment option instead 
after realizing that market rents were very high. 
 There is no required inclusionary zoning in Concord, but town planners list efforts to 
promote affordable housing development including asking developers to include an affordability 
component and working with developers on proposed 40B projects.  Concord is not considering 
adopting the new Smart Growth overlay district of Chapter 40R because it requires too much 
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density for the town.  As an alternative, a proposed mixed-use village center overlay outlined in 
the new Comprehensive Long Range Plan would allow higher densities and second-floor 
residential development over retail in specified village center areas.  However, a specific zoning 
amendment has yet to be proposed or passed. 
 
Development Profile 
Fairhaven Garden is a 42-unit rental development in six buildings.  Eleven of the units 
are affordable to households at 80% of area median income.  The development is situated on six 
acres of land along the Concord Turnpike near the commuter rail station and Concord Center.  
The project received a comprehensive permit in 2003 and was completed in 2004. 
The development has an interesting and contentious history.  Originally a working farm, 
the owners proposed a daycare center on the property in the late 1990s and requested that the 
land be converted from agricultural to institutional use.  This plan was vehemently opposed by 
neighborhood residents, who were concerned about the traffic impacts of the proposal.  Both the 
town and the neighbors sued the landowners to stop the use change, and the developers entered 
into mediated negotiation with the town.  Through this process, multifamily housing was agreed 
on as an alternative to the daycare center.  Both the developer and the town wanted  the project to 
Figure 3.9: Fairhaven Gardens 
 
be rental and to use the 40B process.  The 
developer realized that the project would 
require multiple variances that would be 
very difficult to get, and believed that the 
comprehensive permit process would go 
more quickly.  The town wanted to be able  
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Figure 3.10: Aerial view in single-family neighborhood to count all of the units towards its ten 
percent goal. 
Although the neighborhood accepted 
Fairhaven Gardens as a compromise in 
mediation, nearby residents were still 
concerned about impacts of the project and 
there was ongoing confrontation throughout 
the year-and-a-half permitting process.  
There was no organized opposition or  
 
formal appeals to the comprehensive permit, but many concerns were raised at public meetings 
including noise, size, landscape issues, and lighting issues.  The neighborhood remains 
concerned about the project’s impacts and still complains to the town about issues such as 
screening, lighting and trash removal.   
 
Scenario 3: Creating Affordability by Increasing Supply  
Underlying the “carrot” logic of Chapter 40R and other recent state initiatives is 
Governor Romney’s conviction that the housing affordability issue is primarily caused by an 
artificially constrained supply of units.  Romney has argued that by encouraging housing 
production and increasing the number of units, the Massachusetts housing market can be brought 
into equilibrium and the affordability crisis resolved. 
With the lack of residential construction in the suburbs of the Greater Boston Area, it is 
hard to find a location to test this basic tenant of supply and demand.  However, Canton 
represents one of the most active building markets in the region, and contains an area that has 
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recently added a significant number of units and been revitalized as a mixed-use, transit oriented 
town center.  Even though the new developments in Canton Center were not built with a specific 
affordability component, I chose to include the town as a case study because of the scope of the 
transformation of the area and the large number of new residential developments built in the last 
five years.  
 
Case 5: Canton Center 
Town Profile 
 The town of Canton lies 18 miles southwest of Boston.  Though the town is primarily 
residential, several parts of Canton, including the area around the Canton Center commuter rail 
station, have a mix of residential, commercial, and industrial uses.  Canton’s current zoning 
includes many types of residential areas, and has several inclusionary zoning provisions with 
affordability requirements from five to fifteen percent.  As of 2005, Canton is the only town of 
the five case studies that has reached the ten percent 40B requirement. 
 
Planning efforts 
With a central commuter rail stop, a mixed-use main street, and a number of large, 
relatively dense residential projects, Canton Center is an example of many of the principles of 
Smart Growth development.   However, a local developer recalls that in the late 1990s, Canton 
Center was a disaster, with dilapidated buildings, run-down retail, and many abandoned or 
underutilized parcels.  The turning point for Canton Center was the establishment of the Canton 
Center Economic Opportunity District (CCEOD) in 2000.   At the time the economic 
revitalization of the area was one of the primary goals of the planning department.  The CCEOD 
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zoning bylaw was the result of a two-year public process in which the town and consultants from 
the Metropolitan Area Planning Council gathered ideas and requirements from town officials, 
residents, and local businesses, created the bylaw, and built support for the rezoning.  Many 
people were nervous about the rezoning and central points of contention included density, the 
spread of commercial uses, and the concern that Canton still look like a town and not become a 
city.  In response, the boundaries of the CCEOD zone were reduced to keep the higher-density 
zone to the downtown area and restrict commercial uses to Washington Street and design 
guidelines were included in the bylaw to reflect the style of the traditional New England town 
center.  Local planners spent two years in meetings and charrettes, and were able to get 
widespread support for the amendment.  In 2000, the CCEOD bylaw passed Town Meeting by a 
unanimous vote. 
The overlay district encourages mixed-use development with relatively flexible density 
and dimensional requirements.  Although the CCEOD District was not conceived as a way to 
increase the production of affordable housing, in 2004, an inclusionary zoning provision was 
added to the CCEOD overlay zone.29  This amendment requires a minimum of 15 percent of 
affordable units be included in residential projects in the overlay area.  When the CCEOD was 
passed, the town was unwilling to commit any public funds to the revitalization effort and town 
planners were not certain that the new district could attract private money to Canton Center.  As 
projects in the zone have proven economically successful and the residential real estate market 
has appreciated, the town decided to require an affordable component for new developments.  
The new provision has not slowed development in the area, and several new projects with an 
affordability component are currently under construction. 
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Development Profile 
In the past five years, John Marini has developed over 200 units of housing under the 
CCEOD bylaw30 and he currently has more projects underway.   Figure 3.11 shows a summary 
of Marini’s developments around Canton Center.  Marini started his career as a house builder, 
and by the late 1990s had developed thousands of units of single- and multifamily homes in the 
area around Boston.  Marini, who lives in Canton, built many apartments in the area, and had 
developed a reputation with the town and residents as a good developer and a positive local 
influence. He describes the typical residents of his projects as young singles and couples that 
work in Boston or are elderly.  He believes that there are very few families living in his projects, 
and claims that there are only six children living in the 200+ units that he has developed.  He 
maintains that repeated traffic studies have shown no impact on parking or traffic levels from his 
developments in Canton Center, and notes that on average, the developments are only using 75 
percent of the parking spaces that were built.  He attributes this to the fact that when housing is 
close to transit, many households go from a two-car family to a one-car family. 
 
Chart 3.11: John Marini’s Canton Center Developments 
Development Name Washington Place Forge Pond 
Canton Commons 
/ Paul Revere 
Village Grover Estates 
Permitted/Completed 2001/2001 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2006 
Total Units 47 38 206 45 (2 affordable) 
Tenure Rental Condo Condo Condo 
Retail Component 10,000sf 8,000sf None 6,500sf 
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Figure 3.12: Canton Commons, Village at Forge Pond, Grover Estates, Washington St 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Aerial view of Canton Center with developments It is clear that Marini’s reputation 
and long history with the town has 
allowed him to be extremely active in 
Canton Center.  Marini acknowledges 
that his good rapport with the town has 
allowed him to be as successful as he 
has been, and notes that although 
Canton is relatively progressive and 
not the type of town to give in to 
NIMBYism, the density levels of his 
projects in Canton Center are nearly  
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impossible to achieve in any town.  Though Marini chose to avoid public subsidies and develop 
within the conventional market, he also acknowledges that if it wasn’t for 40B, there wouldn’t be 
any multifamily built anywhere in Massachusetts.  Marini, who once served on the Board of 
Directors of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Authority, believes that affordable housing will 
come without anyone trying and that the building of apartments in Massachusetts will eventually 
result in a softening of the market.  
 
                                                 
1 Reading’s PUD bylaw allows for a height bonus if at least ten percent of the units are affordable at below 80% 
AMI, and the PRD bylaw includes a density bonus (for PRD-G) or a requirement (for PRD-M) for at least ten 
percent of affordable units (100% of AMI) or 15% moderately priced units (at 125% AMI). Zoning By-laws, Town 
of Reading Zoning Board of Appeals, http://www.ci.reading.ma.us/planning/zbahomepage.htm, 
2 Reading Community Development Plan, Reading Master Plan Advisory Committee, 
http://www.ci.reading.ma.us/planning/finalmapcplan.pdf 
3 The zoning requires a minimum of ten percent of units be set aside for “very-low-income, low-income and 
moderate-income families and/or elderly households.” Zoning By-laws, Town of Reading Zoning Board of Appeals, 
http://www.ci.reading.ma.us/planning/zbahomepage.htm, p. 29 
4 Longwood Place, like many assisted living facilities, is one large connected structure, allowing senior residents to 
move around the facility in a protected environment. 
5 And for fried clams – try The Clam Box! 
6 Ipswich Demographic Changes, Chuck Koller’s Homepage, http://www.ckollars.org/demographicchanges.html 
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CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter details the results of the analysis of house prices in each of the five case 
studies.  For each case study, I used descriptive statistics and regression analysis to build hedonic 
models that explain the observed house sale prices for both the control and impact data sets.  I 
also build the sales price index for the average home through time using the equation that was 
constructed with the coefficients from the hedonic model.  I then compare the price trend in the 
impact zone to the rest of the town, paying particular attention to the years during and 
immediately following permitting and construction of the development.  Because the 
independent variables used to build the model1 were identical in the control and impact zones 
and both data sets represent homes in the same town (minimizing the impact of difference in 
macro-level externalities such as school district and tax rate), differences between the two can be 
attributed to the introduction of a large new development.   
Although each case is slightly different, in general, I compared sales in the years directly 
before permitting of the development with those in the years directly after the construction and 
lease-up of the development was concluded.  This method assumes that potential negative 
impacts from a development begin when the project is considered likely to be built (for example, 
has final approvals in the form of a comprehensive or other permit) and peaks after the 
construction is finished and occupancy is stabilized.  It assumes that the market will react to any 
negative externalities of the development within that timeframe. 
There are arguments that multifamily and mixed-income developments age poorly, become 
run down and increasingly impact the neighborhood, but the duration of that kind of analysis is 
outside the scope of this study.  However, for some of the older case studies, it is possible to 
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compare the impact and control areas for many years after the development was constructed and 
see if there is any ongoing or continuing impact on sales prices. 
In every case but Abington, I use paired years for the sales period variable to ensure that 
there were multiple observations for each period.  A small sample size increases noise in the 
results, and incorporating more observations reduces standard error and provides a more accurate 
estimate of the impact of each sales period on the sales price.  Further differences in variables are 
described in each case below.   Details about the variables I used to construct the regression 
analysis can be reviewed in Appendix 5.1. 
 
Case 1: Longwood  Place at Reading 
Location and Impact Zone 
 Longwood Place is a large age-restricted development situated on an expansive parcel in 
the middle of a single family neighborhood.  There are single-family homes to the east, south, 
and west, and a forest forms a natural barrier to the northeast.  Main Street, the nearest 
commercial street, is two blocks to the west.  This street creates another edge of the impact zone.  
Longwood Place is very large and its open campus is visible throughout the surrounding 
neighborhood.  In addition, Longwood Place borders Charles Street, a main feeder street from 
the neighborhood to the north to Main Street. 
The impact area for this case comprises about nine streets of homes, and includes single-
family homes as far as 500 meters or three streets away from the development.  Houses with a 
direct visual line to the development were included in the impact zone. 
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Figure 5.1: Impact zone for Longwood Place  
Because of Longwood 
Place’s open campus, this 
visual area proved to be 
extensive.  Houses that were 
“trapped” by the street 
pattern of the neighborhood 
(i.e.: have to pass the 
development in order to 
access Main Street) were 
also included in the impact 
zone.   
 
Sales Data 
 The Reading control data set included 5,061 records and the impact zone included 147 
records.  Table 5.2 gives a summary of the data characteristics, while Appendix 5.2 contains 
detailed descriptive statistics about the data.  There were only minimal differences in control and 
impact home characteristics, indicating that the housing stock that sold is similar in both areas. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Summary of Reading Data 
  Mean Std. Deviation 
Variable Control Impact Control Impact 
# Observations   5,061  147  - - 
Price $257,348 $280,877 $116,820 $129,346 
House sf 1,729 1,881 634 527 
Lot size 15,546 15,329 10,340 6,996 
Bedrooms 3.20 3.32 0.76 0.68 
   1-2BR 14.6% 8.2%     
   3BR 55.3% 55.8%     
   4BR 25.9% 32.0%     
   >=5BR 4.1% 4.1%     
Bathrooms 1.82 1.98 0.67 0.61 
   1bath 24.9% 12.9%     
   1.5bath 25.5% 25.2%     
   2bath 21.9% 21.1%     
   >=2.5bath 27.7% 40.8%     
Year Built 1947 1949 35 38 
   <=1920 18.3% 28.6%     
   1921-1934 9.6% 2.7%     
   1935-1948 13.8% 8.8%     
   1949-1954 14.5% 4.1%     
   1955-1964 14.8% 3.4%     
   1965-1981 13.8% 35.4%     
   >=1982 15.1% 17.0%     
Bold variables are base cases and are omitted from the Hedonic regression. 
 
Hedonic Models 
 I will use the model for the control area of Reading shown in Table 5.3 to explain general 
features about the hedonic models for all of the case studies. 
Table 5.3 lists all of the independent variables (house characteristics) and their 
relationship to the independent variable (natural log of observed prices2) as represented by the 
coefficient values.  The first, or constant, value is the base estimate for house price,3 in this case 
$113,437.  As described in Chapter 3, there are two types of variables, continuous and dummy.  
The two continuous variables are LOTSIZE (the size of the home’s lot, in square feet), and 
INTERSF (or the interior square footage of the home).  The dummy variables include the year 
the home was built, the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, and the year the house 
was sold.  For each set of dummy variables, the minimum group is considered the base case, with 
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a coefficient of 0, and is left out of the model.  Each variable in the model has a coefficient 
related to it that explains that variable’s addition (or subtraction) to the price of the home, 
assuming all of the other independent variables are held constant.  Because I used the natural 
logarithm of the price, the unstandardized coefficient for each variable is actually describing that 
variable’s contribution to the natural log of the price.  In the next column, standardized 
coefficient, the values are converted to a percentage format that relates to the actual sale price.  
For example, in the control area of Reading, a home with one and a half baths is worth 11.9% 
more than the base case house (with one bath), if all other characteristics are held constant.  
Similarly, a house that sold in 1993-94 was worth 1.9% less than a house that sold in 1987-88 
(the base value for year sold).   
In general, the coefficients for the Reading control area make intuitive sense.  Both house 
and lot size are positively correlated with prices – the more is more theory of house value.  
Additional bedrooms and bathrooms add value over the base case, and newer construction is 
more valuable than homes built before 1921.  Finally, the variable describing year sold reflects 
the regional housing market over the past 18 years: decreasing home prices through the early 
1990s, with a recovery in the mid- to late-90s, then rapid appreciation since 2000.   
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Table 5.3: Hedonic Model for Reading Control Area 
READING CONTROL 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
(Constant) 11.6390 - 0.0231 503.1286 0.0000 
built1921-1934 0.0703 7.3% 0.0167 4.1985 0.0000 
built1935-1948 0.0765 7.9% 0.0153 5.0122 0.0000 
built1949-1954 0.0685 7.1% 0.0150 4.5709 0.0000 
built1955-1964 0.1011 10.6% 0.0150 6.7277 0.0000 
built1965-1981 0.2003 22.2% 0.0158 12.6415 0.0000 
built>=1982 0.1043 11.0% 0.0165 6.3326 0.0000 
sold89-90 -0.0492 -4.8% 0.0183 -2.6933 0.0071 
sold91-92 -0.0917 -8.8% 0.0178 -5.1424 0.0000 
sold93-94 -0.0192 -1.9% 0.0174 -1.1015 0.2707 
sold95-96 0.0736 7.6% 0.0175 4.1986 0.0000 
sold97-98 0.1622 17.6% 0.0176 9.2302 0.0000 
sold99-00 0.3884 47.5% 0.0180 21.5984 0.0000 
sold01-02 0.6585 93.2% 0.0180 36.5921 0.0000 
sold03-05 0.8097 124.7% 0.0175 46.2833 0.0000 
1.5bath 0.1124 11.9% 0.0124 9.0562 0.0000 
2.0bath 0.0929 9.7% 0.0132 7.0142 0.0000 
2.5bath 0.1862 20.5% 0.0166 11.2253 0.0000 
3BR 0.0641 6.6% 0.0129 4.9672 0.0000 
4BR 0.1484 16.0% 0.0163 9.0878 0.0000 
>=5BR 0.1307 14.0% 0.0266 4.9143 0.0000 
LOTSIZE 0.000001 N/A 0.000000 3.2951 0.0010 
INTERSF 0.000126 N/A 0.000010 12.2185 0.0000 
Model Summary 
# of Observations  5,961  Adjusted R Square 0.566 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.295519 
* omitted: built<=1920, sold87-88, 1.0bath, <=2BR 
 
Similarly, the model for the Reading impact area shows reasonable results for the 
independent variables.  One difference is that in this area, additional bathrooms do not seem to 
add value to a house.  This is not an unusual result for room number variables. The model 
assumes that all other characteristics of the house, including total interior square footage, stays 
the same, so the space for an additional half-bath is sacrificed from somewhere else in the base 
house.  The smaller size of this data set is reflected in the higher standard errors in this model, 
and in general more observations lead to lower standard errors and a more dependable model. 
 
 68
Table 5.4: Hedonic Model for Reading Impact Area 
READING IMPACT 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
(Constant) 11.7639 - 0.1551 75.8368 0.0000 
built1921-1934 0.1079 11.4% 0.1531 0.7049 0.4822 
built1935-1948 0.2177 24.3% 0.0988 2.2031 0.0294 
built1949-1954 0.1925 21.2% 0.1324 1.4534 0.1486 
built1955-1964 0.1197 12.7% 0.1421 0.8423 0.4012 
built1965-1981 0.4022 49.5% 0.0759 5.2992 0.0000 
built>=1982 0.3650 44.1% 0.0907 4.0246 0.0001 
sold89-90 -0.1829 -16.7% 0.1144 -1.5996 0.1122 
sold91-92 -0.0634 -6.1% 0.1149 -0.5518 0.5821 
sold93-94 -0.0732 -7.1% 0.1013 -0.7225 0.4713 
sold95-96 -0.1060 -10.1% 0.1082 -0.9799 0.3291 
sold97-98 0.1344 14.4% 0.1057 1.2709 0.2062 
sold99-00 0.4078 50.4% 0.1151 3.5430 0.0006 
sold01-02 0.3132 36.8% 0.1593 1.9660 0.0515 
sold03-05 0.7377 109.1% 0.1036 7.1195 0.0000 
1.5bath -0.0250 -2.5% 0.0892 -0.2799 0.7800 
2.0bath -0.0407 -4.0% 0.0977 -0.4163 0.6779 
2.5bath 0.0612 6.3% 0.1206 0.5077 0.6125 
3BR 0.1604 17.4% 0.0952 1.6841 0.0947 
4BR 0.3171 37.3% 0.1115 2.8446 0.0052 
>=5BR 0.3368 40.1% 0.1610 2.0926 0.0384 
LOTSIZE 0.000001 N/A 0.0000 0.2569 0.7977 
INTERSF 0.000037 N/A 0.0001 0.4940 0.6222 
Model Summary 
# of Observations 147  Adjusted R Square 0.674 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.273887 
* omitted: built<=1920, sold87-88, 1.0bath, <=2BR 
 
Price Index 
Using the models and descriptive statistics above, I was able to price the average house in 
both the control and impact areas.  As explained in the Chapter 3, this average house is a 
theoretical amalgam of all of the average characteristics of houses in each data sample. For each 
sample I start with the base price (the constant) and add the average lot size, the average interior 
square footage, the average impact of all of the possible bedroom configurations, and so on.  The 
year sold variable is not included in this calculation. This equation, which can be seen in 
Appendix 5.2, produces the natural log of the price of the average house in the base sales year 
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(1987-88).   From there, the impact of each sales year is added, and the result converted back 
into a true sales price.  The result is a sales price index over time for a theoretical average house 
in both the control and impact areas.  
 
Figure 5.5: Sales Price Index for Reading Control vs. Impact Areas 
 
 
Longwood Place received its permits in late 1994 and opened for rental in 1996.  Thus, 
the height of the impact of the development is assumed to be during the 1995-1996 sales year 
pair, as is shown in Figure 5.5.  In order to determine the effect of the development, I compared 
the change from 1993-94 to 1997-98.  In this time, the impact area appreciated an annual rate of 
4.2%, while the control area appreciated 3.7%.4  I conclude that in that time, the development did 
not have any negative impact on single-family house prices in its immediate vicinity.  
It is obvious in Figure 5.5 that the value for the impact area price in the 2001-02 years is 
irregular.  In looking back at Table 5.4, this variable shows an unusually high standard error, 
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indicating that at least one data record in this group has unusual or greatly skewed properties.  
Indeed, in looking back at the data, there is one transaction that has a significantly lower price 
than the others, although not low enough to be removed from the sample.  The impact trend 
corrects in the 2003-05 sales period, when the price index returns to its previous trajectory. I 
conclude that the 2001-02 blip was caused by the small data sample for that year pair and one 
unusual transaction, rather than any real event in the impact zone. 
 
Case 2: Oak Hill 
Location and Impact Zone 
Oak Hill is located on a mixed-use commercial strip in the town center of Ipswich.  
Central Street, with a mix of residential, commercial, and small mixed-use buildings, borders the 
development to the south.  To the north, east, and west, the development is surrounded by single-
family homes.  Oak Hill is significantly larger and denser than other uses in the areas.  
Additionally, it is set up on a rise, and is quite visible from around the neighborhood. 
I determined that the impact area for this case is an area of approximately 0.75 square 
kilometers.  The impact zone includes single-family homes as far as 600 meters or three streets 
away from Oak Hill.  Houses with a direct visual line to the development were included in the 
impact zone, as were houses that were “trapped” by the street pattern of the neighborhood (i.e.: 
have to pass the development in order to access Central Street).  Additionally, houses on the 
opposite side of Central Street were included in the impact zone because of the area’s 
topography and the resulting visibility of the development.   
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 Figure 5.6: Impact zone for Oak Hill 
 
 
 
Sales Data 
Unfortunately, the sales data for Ipswich was not appropriate for analysis by this 
methodology.  Once cleaned, the Ipswich control data set included 2,616 records but the impact 
zone included only 60 records.  Table 5.7 gives a summary of the data characteristics, while 
Appendix 5.3 contains detailed descriptive statistics about the data.  In addition to the small 
sample size, the data for the Ipswich control and impact zones was very different.  Houses that 
sold in the impact zone were much smaller and were situated on much smaller lots.  In addition, 
85% of the sales transactions for the impact zone were homes that were built before 1920, thus 
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falling into the base case and out of the predictive model.  The town center area that comprises 
the impact zone includes a much older than average housing stock than the rest of the town. 
 
Table 5.7: Descriptive Summary of Ipswich Data 
  Mean Std. Deviation 
Variable Control Impact Control Impact 
# Observations    2,616       60  - - 
Price $279,311 $226,660 $190,532 $110,996 
House sf 2,269 1,744 1,076 679 
Lot size 44,606 8,037 116,481 7,135 
Bedrooms 3.09 2.98 0.83 0.91 
   1BR 2.7% 1.7%     
   2BR 16.9% 26.7%     
   3BR 54.3% 48.3%     
   >=4BR 26.2% 23.3%     
Bathrooms 2.09 1.63 0.88 0.62 
   1bath 22.5% 33.3%     
   1.5bath 14.8% 33.3%     
   2.0bath 20.3% 15.0%     
   2.5bath 25.2% 13.3%     
   >=3.0bath 17.3% 5.0%     
Year Built 1952 1834 52 81 
   <1920 18.2% 85.0%     
   1920-1954 19.6% 15.0%     
   1955-1969 18.7% 0.0%     
   1970-1991 22.4% 0.0%     
   >=1992 21.1% 0.0%     
Bold variables are base cases and are omitted from the Hedonic regression. 
 
Price Models 
As predicted, the hedonic models for Ipswich, particularly for the impact zone, are 
seriously flawed.  There were no observations for some of “year built” dummy variables in the 
impact area, which would skew the accuracy of the other variables, as the model attempts to 
compensate for these missing characteristics with the remaining independent variables.  The 
coefficients are not reasonable, as any additional bathroom capacity results in a reduction in 
price, and the year sold variables do not reflect the empirical real estate market evidence.  The 
high standard errors of the impact model casts further doubt on its accuracy.  Clearly, the 
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available data was not extensive or diverse enough to build a strong predictive model for house 
prices in the impact zone.  I decided to omit Ipswich from the sales index analysis, since any 
index built on the below model would be inherently inaccurate and misleading. 
 
Table 5.8: Hedonic Model for Ipswich Control Area 
IPSWICH CONTROL 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
(Constant) 11.4211 - 0.0689 165.8712 0.0000 
sold89-90 0.0773 8.0% 0.0423 1.8284 0.0676 
sold91-92 -0.0961 -9.2% 0.0400 -2.4019 0.0164 
sold93-94 0.0214 2.2% 0.0381 0.5622 0.5740 
sold95-96 0.1860 20.4% 0.0386 4.8249 0.0000 
sold97-98 0.2692 30.9% 0.0371 7.2522 0.0000 
sold99-00 0.5881 80.1% 0.0374 15.7300 0.0000 
sold01-02 0.8213 127.3% 0.0385 21.3231 0.0000 
sold03-05 1.0223 177.9% 0.0369 27.7126 0.0000 
built1920-1954 0.0038 0.4% 0.0303 0.1256 0.9000 
built1955-1969 0.0793 8.3% 0.0304 2.6079 0.0092 
built1970-1991 0.1340 14.3% 0.0304 4.4041 0.0000 
built>=1992 -0.1191 -11.2% 0.0339 -3.5155 0.0004 
1.5bath 0.1093 11.5% 0.0315 3.4729 0.0005 
2.0bath 0.0938 9.8% 0.0296 3.1660 0.0016 
2.5bath 0.2000 22.1% 0.0345 5.7937 0.0000 
>=3.0bath 0.3195 37.6% 0.0447 7.1415 0.0000 
2BR 0.0966 10.1% 0.0603 1.6018 0.1093 
3BR 0.0387 3.9% 0.0581 0.6660 0.5055 
>=4BR 0.0091 0.9% 0.0608 0.1499 0.8808 
LOTSIZE 0.0000 N/A 0.0000 2.9409 0.0033 
INTERSF 0.0002 N/A 0.0000 11.4054 0.0000 
Model Summary 
# of Observations  2,616  Adjusted R Square 0.478 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.46533 
* omitted: built<1920, sold87-88, 1.0bath, <3BR 
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Table 5.9: Hedonic Model for Ipswich Impact Area 
IPSWICH IMPACT 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
(Constant) 11.1182 - 0.4422 25.1404 0.0000 
sold89-90 -0.2909 -25.2% 0.2723 -1.0683 0.2916 
sold91-92 0.1449 15.6% 0.2674 0.5418 0.5909 
sold93-94 -0.1204 -11.3% 0.2274 -0.5295 0.5993 
sold95-96 -0.1956 -17.8% 0.2427 -0.8059 0.4249 
sold97-98 -0.3396 -28.8% 0.2711 -1.2530 0.2173 
sold99-00 0.1092 11.5% 0.2269 0.4814 0.6328 
sold01-02 0.5330 70.4% 0.2152 2.4771 0.0175 
sold03-05 0.7818 118.5% 0.2201 3.5517 0.0010 
built1920-1954 0.0254 2.6% 0.1536 0.1655 0.8694 
built1955-1969 - - - - - 
built1970-1991 - - - - - 
built>=1992 - - - - - 
1.5bath -0.0533 -5.2% 0.1421 -0.3751 0.7095 
2.0bath -0.4443 -35.9% 0.1757 -2.5297 0.0154 
2.5bath -0.0326 -3.2% 0.2625 -0.1242 0.9018 
>=3.0bath -0.3122 -26.8% 0.3349 -0.9321 0.3568 
2BR 0.0149 1.5% 0.4156 0.0358 0.9716 
3BR 0.1690 18.4% 0.4226 0.3999 0.6913 
>=4BR -0.3984 -32.9% 0.4808 -0.8286 0.4121 
LOTSIZE 0.00001 N/A 0.00001 1.5582 0.1269 
INTERSF 0.00053 N/A 0.00015 3.5554 0.0010 
Model Summary 
# of Observations            60  Adjusted R Square 0.532 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.36140 
* omitted: built<1920, sold87-88, 1.0bath, <3BR 
 
 
Case 3: The Woodlands at Abington Station 
Location and Impact Zone 
The Woodlands at Abington Station is located just a few hundred meters from the MBTA 
commuter rail station.  Although the development is not near the town center of Abington, it was 
marketed to the town during permitting and to potential residents as “transit-oriented” 
development.   Although the development is isolated visually from all but its closest neighbors, it 
is so different in scale from the surrounding area that its impact reaches beyond sight lines.  One 
of the primary reasons that abutters give in objecting to development is the impact on traffic and 
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road service levels.  The Woodlands, with 192 units and many parking spaces, certainly impacts 
the surrounding roads.  Therefore, I extended the impact area to nearby residential roads that 
share the same access routes to the commuter rail station and the town center.  There is a pond 
that creates a natural boundary to the north of the development.  Overall, the impact zone is 
about one square kilometer, and includes homes as far as 800 meters away.   
 
Figure 5.10: Impact zone for The Woodlands at Abington Station 
 
 
 
Sales Data 
There were 2,900 single-family sales transactions in Abington from 1987 until the 
present.  After removing incomplete records and outliers, I analyzed 203 transactions in the 
impact zone and 2,435 transactions in the control area (the rest of the town).  Table 5.11 gives a 
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summary of the data characteristics, while Appendix 5.4 contains detailed descriptive statistics 
about the data.  There were minimal differences in control and impact home characteristics, such 
as house and lot size, and the impact zone is slightly older than the rest of the town.  Overall, 
there seems to be little difference in the housing stock that has sold in both areas. 
 
Table 5.11: Descriptive Summary of Abington Data 
  Mean Std. Deviation 
Variable Control Impact Control Impact 
# Observations  2,435  203  - - 
Price $194,274 $180,248 $134,225 $83,657 
House sf 1,670 1,593 712 557 
Lot size 23,526 24,048 16,259 16,681 
Bedrooms 3.05 3.04 0.76 0.74 
   1-2BR 19.3% 16.3%     
   3BR 58.9% 64.0%     
   >=4BR 21.8% 19.7%     
Bathrooms 1.76 1.61 0.74 0.60 
   1bath 33.6% 36.9%     
   1.5bath 20.3% 23.2%     
   2bath 18.6% 24.1%     
   >=2.5bath 27.6% 15.8%     
Year Built 1950 1937 40 48 
   <=1900 17.9% 28.1%     
   1901-1945 10.3% 11.8%     
   1946-1959 29.4% 9.4%     
   1960-1971 9.9% 27.6%     
   1972-1990 14.0% 14.3%     
   >=1991 18.5% 8.9%     
Bold variables are base cases and are omitted from the Hedonic regression. 
 
Price Models 
 Both the control and impact models show generally consistent and expected values for 
the coefficients of the independent variables.  Newer structures seem to command a premium in 
Abington.  This might also explain the positive impact of interior square footage and >2.5 
bathrooms, both common features in newer homes.   By breaking out the sales period into years 
rather than year pairs, the real estate trends over time are clearer.  In both the control and impact 
areas, the real estate market appreciated until the end of the 1980s, then dipped and did not start 
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to recover until around 1998.  The annual breakout also shows that prices have been climbing at 
ever higher rates for the past five years.  
 
Table 5.12: Hedonic Model for Abington Control Area 
ABINGTON CONTROL 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
    (Constant) 11.3114 - 0.1307 303.3595 0.0000 
built1901-1945 0.0391 4.0% 0.0764 1.5565 0.1197 
built1946-1959 0.1199 12.7% 0.0845 6.0905 0.0000 
built1960-1971 0.1708 18.6% 0.0573 6.6808 0.0000 
built1972-1990 0.2890 33.5% 0.0681 11.5848 0.0000 
built<=1991 0.2148 24.0% 0.0815 8.9103 0.0000 
3BR -0.0027 -0.3% 0.0671 -0.1497 0.8810 
>=4BR 0.0237 2.4% 0.0891 0.9771 0.3286 
1.5Ba 0.0358 3.6% 0.0566 1.8264 0.0679 
2Ba -0.0059 -0.6% 0.0578 -0.2898 0.7720 
>=2.5Ba 0.1071 11.3% 0.0795 4.4134 0.0000 
sold88 0.0755 7.8% 0.1251 1.9092 0.0564 
sold89 0.0087 0.9% 0.1368 0.2012 0.8405 
sold90 -0.1553 -14.4% 0.1941 -3.6766 0.0002 
sold91 -0.1329 -12.4% 0.1241 -3.3222 0.0009 
sold92 -0.1186 -11.2% 0.1323 -3.0771 0.0021 
sold93 -0.1858 -17.0% 0.1145 -5.0131 0.0000 
sold94 -0.1266 -11.9% 0.1132 -3.3646 0.0008 
sold95 -0.1414 -13.2% 0.1146 -3.6801 0.0002 
sold96 -0.0697 -6.7% 0.1309 -1.7587 0.0788 
sold97 -0.0040 -0.4% 0.1211 -0.1026 0.9183 
sold98 0.1134 12.0% 0.1242 2.9896 0.0028 
sold99 0.2211 24.7% 0.1161 6.1320 0.0000 
sold00 0.3682 44.5% 0.1380 10.1671 0.0000 
sold01 0.5038 65.5% 0.1185 13.0469 0.0000 
sold02 0.6108 84.2% 0.1192 15.3844 0.0000 
sold03 0.7582 113.4% 0.1241 19.9810 0.0000 
sold04-05 0.9044 147.0% 0.1050 24.7852 0.0000 
LOTSIZE 0.000002 N/A 0.0000 3.8253 0.0001 
INTERSF 0.000202 N/A 0.0001 14.9738 0.0000 
Model Summary 
# of Observations     2,435  Adjusted R Square 0.631 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.31436 
* omitted: built<=1900, sold87, 1.0bath, <=2BR 
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Table 5.13: Hedonic Model for Reading Control Area 
ABINGTON IMPACT 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
    (Constant) 11.3326 -   86.6900 0.0000 
built1901-1945 -0.1496 -13.9% -0.1023 -1.9576 0.0519 
built1946-1959 0.1243 13.2% 0.0767 1.4712 0.1431 
built1960-1971 0.1552 16.8% 0.1469 2.7077 0.0075 
built1972-1990 0.2210 24.7% 0.1638 3.2454 0.0014 
built<=1991 0.1288 13.7% 0.0775 1.5799 0.1160 
3BR 0.0843 8.8% 0.0857 1.2568 0.2105 
>=4BR -0.0945 -9.0% -0.0796 -1.0604 0.2904 
1.5Ba 0.0758 7.9% 0.0677 1.3396 0.1821 
2Ba 0.0282 2.9% 0.0256 0.4883 0.6259 
>=2.5Ba 0.1136 12.0% 0.0876 1.4287 0.1549 
sold88 0.1815 19.9% 0.0832 1.4505 0.1487 
sold89 0.1284 13.7% 0.0496 0.9387 0.3492 
sold90 -0.0032 -0.3% -0.0008 -0.0163 0.9870 
sold91 -0.0892 -8.5% -0.0409 -0.7185 0.4734 
sold92 -0.2807 -24.5% -0.1157 -2.1214 0.0353 
sold93 -0.1810 -16.6% -0.1062 -1.5809 0.1157 
sold94 -0.0102 -1.0% -0.0056 -0.0900 0.9284 
sold95 -0.1358 -12.7% -0.0729 -1.1854 0.2375 
sold96 -0.0030 -0.3% -0.0013 -0.0228 0.9818 
sold97 -0.0267 -2.6% -0.0128 -0.2206 0.8256 
sold98 0.1776 19.4% 0.0814 1.4295 0.1547 
sold99 0.1559 16.9% 0.0837 1.3433 0.1809 
sold00 0.1732 18.9% 0.0670 1.2551 0.2111 
sold01 0.5491 73.2% 0.2743 4.6316 0.0000 
sold02 0.5531 73.9% 0.2763 4.6398 0.0000 
sold03 0.7300 107.5% 0.3346 5.8809 0.0000 
sold04-05 0.9461 157.6% 0.6352 9.0126 0.0000 
LOTSIZE 0.0000 N/A 0.1574 3.4142 0.0008 
INTERSF 0.0001 N/A 0.1330 2.1993 0.0292 
Model Summary 
# of Observations  203  Adjusted R Square 0.658 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.27695 
* omitted: built<=1900, sold87, 1.0bath, <=2BR 
 
Price Index 
In the Abington case study, there were enough observations in both samples to divide the 
sales year independent variable into annual groups rather than year pairs.  This was particularly 
important for the case of The Woodlands, since the development was not fully leased until the 
fall of 2003.  Thus, the first period after this impact window was 2004-55.  With the annual year 
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division, I could break out the timeframe in order to see this impact more clearly.  The 
Woodlands received its comprehensive permit in 2001.  Thus, the height of the impact of the 
development is assumed to be during the 2001-2003 sales years, as is shown in Figure 5.14.  In 
order to determine the effect of the development, I compared the change from 2000 to 2004-5.  
In this time, the impact area appreciated 21.3%, while the control area appreciated 14.3%.  I 
conclude that the development did not have any negative impact on single-family house prices in 
its immediate vicinity.   It is tempting to speculate that The Woodlands actually had a beneficial 
impact on neighboring home prices, particularly because the development was a reuse of a 
blighted former industrial site. It is possible that this higher and better use of the land as well as 
the TOD rezoning actually helped raise surrounding home prices. 
 
Figure 5.14: Sales Price Index for Abington Control vs. Impact Areas 
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Case 4: Fairhaven Garden 
Location and Impact Zone 
Fairhaven Garden is located on the Concord Turnpike in the midst of a low-density 
single-family residential neighborhood.  The development is bordered to the south and west by 
undeveloped land that creates a natural border for the impact zone.  There is also undeveloped 
agricultural land across the turnpike from Fairhaven Garden, but because it is possible to see the 
development from beyond the farm, I did not treat this land as the end of the impact zone.  In 
addition, all foot and automobile traffic from Fairhaven would have to drive through the 
residential neighborhood to the north of the project to get to Concord Center.  Therefore, I 
included the edges of this neighborhood in the impact zone.  Overall, the impact zone contains 
only about seven streets, and includes homes up to about 120 meters from the development. 
 
Figure 5.15: Impact zone for Fairhaven Gardens 
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Sales Data 
There were 3,514 single-family sales transactions in Concord from 1987 until the present.  
After removing incomplete records and outliers, I analyzed 100 transactions in the impact zone 
and 3,360 transactions in the remainder of the town.  Table 5.16 provides a summary of the data 
characteristics, while Appendix 5.5 contains detailed descriptive statistics about the data.  While 
the homes in the impact area were slightly smaller and on marginally smaller lots, overall, there 
is little difference in the housing stock that has sold in both areas. 
 
Table 5.16: Descriptive Summary of Concord Data  
  Mean Std. Deviation 
Variable Control Impact Control Impact 
# Observations   3,360      100  - - 
Price $522,791 $430,802 $428,048 $274,996 
House sf 2,603 2,314 1,364 1,530 
Lot size 47,814 39,004 74,206 56,677 
Bedrooms 3.76 3.50 0.91 0.84 
   1-2BR 5.7% 5.0%     
   3BR 33.3% 53.0%     
   4BR 42.7% 33.0%     
   >=5BR 18.3% 9.0%     
Bathrooms 2.79 2.19 1.33 1.10 
   1bath 7.7% 13.0%     
   1.5-2.0bath 28.2% 45.0%     
   2.5bath 30.2% 26.0%     
   3.0-4.0bath 15.3% 10.0%     
   >=4.5bath 18.6% 6.0%     
Year Built 1946 1934 44 46 
   <=1900 15.2% 11.0%     
   1901-1945 14.5% 40.0%     
   1946-1954 14.5% 21.0%     
   1955-1964 16.1% 9.0%     
   1965-1974 17.3% 9.0%     
   1975-1984 8.2% 3.0%     
   >=1985 14.2% 7.0%     
Bold variables are base cases and are omitted from Hedonic regression. 
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 Price Models 
Both the control and impact models show generally consistent and expected values for the 
coefficients of the independent variables.  As opposed to other cases, the Concord real estate 
market, particularly in the control group, started to grow again in the early 1990s.  In both 
groups, older and newer homes seem to command a premium, while mid-century construction 
does not.  As noted in the Case Studies profile, Concord has been experiencing many teardowns.  
This trend might explain by the positive coefficient for newer construction.  
 
Table 5.17: Hedonic Model for Concord Control Area 
CONCORD CONTROL 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
(Constant) 11.8396 - 0.0408 290.2172 0.0000 
sold89-90 -0.0302 -3.0% 0.0299 -1.0110 0.3121 
sold91-92 -0.0903 -8.6% 0.0275 -3.2816 0.0010 
sold93-94 0.0023 0.2% 0.0276 0.0830 0.9339 
sold95-96 0.1290 13.8% 0.0275 4.6807 0.0000 
sold97-98 0.2792 32.2% 0.0274 10.2032 0.0000 
sold99-00 0.4869 62.7% 0.0275 17.7203 0.0000 
sold01-02 0.7257 106.6% 0.0294 24.6704 0.0000 
sold03-05 0.8759 140.1% 0.0289 30.3017 0.0000 
built1901-1945 0.0366 3.7% 0.0235 1.5609 0.1186 
built1946-1954 -0.0764 -7.4% 0.0238 -3.2096 0.0013 
built1955-1964 -0.0297 -2.9% 0.0234 -1.2655 0.2058 
built1965-1974 0.0025 0.3% 0.0234 0.1090 0.9132 
built1975-1984 0.0670 6.9% 0.0283 2.3652 0.0181 
built>=1985 0.0886 9.3% 0.0254 3.4915 0.0005 
1.5-2.0bath 0.1414 15.2% 0.0270 5.2284 0.0000 
2.5bath 0.2616 29.9% 0.0298 8.7722 0.0000 
3.0-4.0bath 0.3312 39.3% 0.0330 10.0410 0.0000 
>=4.5bath 0.4318 54.0% 0.0372 11.6188 0.0000 
3BR 0.0467 4.8% 0.0300 1.5576 0.1194 
4BR 0.1208 12.8% 0.0318 3.7964 0.0001 
>=5BR 0.1323 14.1% 0.0363 3.6471 0.0003 
LOTSIZE 0.000001 N/A 0.000000 10.5368 0.0000 
INTERSF 0.000175 N/A 0.000008 20.7545 0.0000 
Model Summary 
# of Observations 3,360  Adjusted R Square 0.671 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.295519
* omitted: built<=1900, sold87-88, 1.0bath, <=2BR 
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Table 5.18: Hedonic Model for Concord Impact Area 
CONCORD IMPACT 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
(Constant) 11.87460 - 0.21285 55.78855 0.00000 
sold89-90 -0.05656 -5.5% 0.12697 -0.44544 0.65727 
sold91-92 -0.01869 -1.9% 0.13299 -0.14055 0.88860 
sold93-94 -0.12630 -11.9% 0.10657 -1.18510 0.23967 
sold95-96 -0.01203 -1.2% 0.11305 -0.10644 0.91551 
sold97-98 0.16305 17.7% 0.09852 1.65508 0.10203 
sold99-00 0.51202 66.9% 0.11071 4.62484 0.00002 
sold01-02 0.69261 99.9% 0.11228 6.16864 0.00000 
sold03-05 0.83432 130.3% 0.11889 7.01753 0.00000 
built1901-1945 0.07026 7.3% 0.10014 0.70164 0.48505 
built1946-1954 -0.02839 -2.8% 0.10423 -0.27238 0.78607 
built1955-1964 -0.16423 -15.1% 0.14235 -1.15370 0.25224 
built1965-1974 0.09804 10.3% 0.12330 0.79515 0.42901 
built1975-1984 0.03812 3.9% 0.18417 0.20696 0.83660 
built>=1985 -0.19533 -17.7% 0.16850 -1.15919 0.25001 
1.5-2.0bath 0.18808 20.7% 0.08507 2.21095 0.03005 
2.5bath 0.30882 36.2% 0.10050 3.07289 0.00294 
3.0-4.0bath 0.58041 78.7% 0.18195 3.18995 0.00207 
>=4.5bath -0.17403 -16.0% 0.42629 -0.40824 0.68425 
3BR 0.05804 6.0% 0.13358 0.43449 0.66517 
4BR 0.10129 10.7% 0.14314 0.70767 0.48132 
>=5BR 0.27747 32.0% 0.18999 1.46045 0.14829 
LOTSIZE 0.0000044 N/A 0.0000011 4.14968 0.00009 
INTERSF 0.0001091 N/A 0.0000011 4.14968 0.00009 
Model Summary 
# of Observations   5,961  Adjusted R Square 0.566 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.295519
* omitted: built<=1900, sold87-88, 1.0bath, <=2BR 
 
 
Price Index 
Fairhaven Garden received its comprehensive permit in 2003 and began leasing in 2004.  
Thus, the height of the impact of the development is assumed to be during the most recent 
period, the 2003-5 sales years, as is shown in Figure 5.18.  This created a unique situation in 
which the impact period continues through the present.  Unfortunately, there were not enough 
observations in the Concord impact zone to split the sales variable into annual periods as in the 
case of Abington.  In the latest two sales periods, 2001-02 and 2003-05, the impact area 
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appreciated 4.8%, while the control area appreciated 5.1%.  I conclude that to date, the 
development has not had any negative impact on single-family house prices in its immediate 
vicinity.  Although this conclusion would be strengthened by an additional data analysis for the 
2005-06 sales period, it appears that the permitting and construction of Fairhaven Garden has not 
had an impact on home prices to date. 
 
Table 5.19: Sales Price Index for Concord Control vs. Impact Areas 
 
 
 
Case 5: Canton Center 
Location and Impact Zone 
Canton Center represents a very different scenario than the other case studies.  In the case 
of Canton Center, several large developments have been built in just a few years in a compact 
area around the rail station.  These developments have added over 200 units to the neighborhood 
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and from all accounts, completely changed the nature of Canton Center.  Therefore, I argue that 
the impact zone comprises the majority of the single-family homes within the overlay district.  
This is an oddly-shaped area bordered on the east by Forge Pond and the west and south by 
commercial/industrial land.  Overall, the impact zone is about 800 by 800 meters, and includes 
homes as far as 300 meters away from one of the developments.  
 
Figure 5.20: Impact zone for Canton Center Economic Development Overlay District 
 
 
 
Sales Data 
There were 3,754 single-family sales transactions in Canton from 1987 until the present.  
After removing incomplete records and outliers, I analyzed 96 transactions in the impact zone 
and 3,102 transactions in the rest of the town.  Table 5.21 provides a summary of the data 
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characteristics, while Appendix 5.6 contains detailed descriptive statistics about the data.  There 
were some differences between housing characteristics in the control and impact zones.  On 
average, the houses in the impact zone were smaller and were on much smaller lots.  In addition, 
they were noticeably older.   
There was another issue with the data for Canton.  Almost two-thirds of the total records 
included a value of 0 for the number of bedrooms.  Upon investigation, I discovered that the 
Canton municipal record (the source for The Warren Group data) does not capture that 
information upon sale.  In order to replace the bedroom variable that I used in every other case 
study, I decided to use the total number of rooms instead of the number of bedrooms.  Although 
it is not a perfect substitute, I decided that by adding the total rooms information, I would be able 
to strengthen the predictive model.  
 
Table 5.21: Descriptive Summary of Canton 
  Mean Std. Deviation 
Variable Control Impact Control Impact 
# 
Observations       3,102             96  - - 
Price $287,214 $183,522 $164,307 $74,418 
House sf 2,029 1,504 979 429 
Lot size 25,198 8,490 20,094 3,057 
Tot Rooms 7.6 6.3 1.8 1.4 
<=5rooms 9.2% 26.0%     
6rooms 15.3% 29.2%     
7rooms 23.9% 25.0%     
8rooms 23.8% 15.6%     
9+rooms 27.8% 4.2%     
Bathrooms 2.07 1.48 0.84 0.46 
   1bath 18.0% 36.5%     
   1.5bath 23.8% 38.5%     
   2bath 14.5% 18.8%     
   >=2.5bath 43.7% 6.3%     
Year Built 1959 1921 36 36 
   <=1920 10.8% 50.0%     
   1921-1949 10.2% 15.6%     
   1950-1959 22.3% 29.2%     
  >=1960 56.7% 5.2%     
Bold variables are base cases and are omitted from Hedonic regression. 
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Price Models 
Both the control and impact models show generally consistent and understandable values 
for the coefficients of the independent variables.  As in Abington, newer homes seem to 
command higher sales prices.  Because there is no variable to describe the number of bedrooms, 
it is impossible to compare the importance of the total number of rooms with the number of 
bedrooms.  However, it is interesting that in the impact zone, where average house size is 
smaller, having more than nine rooms actually decreases the price.  Given the nature of the 
population that might be interested in living in the higher-density, transit-oriented impact zone 
(couples and singles) and that the overall square footage of the dwelling stays the same, perhaps 
lots of small rooms are not as desirable in this area as fewer, larger rooms. 
Table 5.22: Hedonic Model for Canton Control Area 
CANTON CONTROL 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
Constant 11.4843 - 0.0350 328.5308 0.0000 
sold89-90 -0.0449 -4.4% 0.0287 -1.5624 0.1183 
sold91-92 -0.0977 -9.3% 0.0274 -3.5609 0.0004 
sold93-94 -0.0818 -7.9% 0.0275 -2.9709 0.0030 
sold95-96 0.0241 2.4% 0.0264 0.9109 0.3624 
sold97-98 0.1323 14.1% 0.0259 5.1177 0.0000 
sold99-00 0.3605 43.4% 0.0262 13.7623 0.0000 
sold01-02 0.6156 85.1% 0.0271 22.6949 0.0000 
sold03-05 0.8548 135.1% 0.0269 31.7343 0.0000 
built1921-1949 0.0678 7.0% 0.0274 2.4768 0.0133 
built1950-1959 0.1013 10.7% 0.0232 4.3606 0.0000 
built>=1960 0.2264 25.4% 0.0228 9.9414 0.0000 
1.5bath 0.0782 8.1% 0.0218 3.5900 0.0003 
2.0bath 0.0559 5.7% 0.0239 2.3381 0.0194 
>=2.5bath 0.1730 18.9% 0.0257 6.7431 0.0000 
6 rooms 0.0621 6.4% 0.0264 2.3529 0.0187 
7 rooms 0.0981 10.3% 0.0262 3.7355 0.0002 
8 rooms 0.1396 15.0% 0.0272 5.1247 0.0000 
>=9 rooms 0.1509 16.3% 0.0284 5.3094 0.0000 
LOTSIZE 0.000001 N/A 0.0000 3.8701 0.0001 
INTERSF 0.000162 N/A 0.0000 16.6929 0.0000 
Model Summary 
# of Observations  3,102  Adjusted R Square 0.596 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.344561
* Omitted: built<=1920, <=5 rooms, 1Ba, Sold87-88 
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Table 5.23: Hedonic Model for Canton Impact Area 
CANTON IMPACT 
Coefficients Independent 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized  
Standard 
Error t Significance 
Constant 11.10751 - 0.17747 62.58893 0.00000 
sold89-90 -0.00049 -0.05% 0.15247 -0.00323 0.99743 
sold91-92 -0.16390 -15.12% 0.13870 -1.18173 0.24105 
sold93-94 -0.25534 -22.53% 0.13669 -1.86795 0.06567 
sold95-96 -0.04382 -4.29% 0.14557 -0.30104 0.76422 
sold97-98 0.06170 6.36% 0.12668 0.48703 0.62766 
sold99-00 0.25687 29.29% 0.16040 1.60144 0.11348 
sold01-02 0.51550 67.45% 0.13599 3.79068 0.00030 
sold03-05 0.75661 113.10% 0.13247 5.71151 0.00000 
built1921-1949 0.15153 16.36% 0.09807 1.54517 0.12651 
built1950-1959 0.26673 30.57% 0.08194 3.25518 0.00170 
built>=1960 0.31999 37.71% 0.19345 1.65415 0.10228 
1.5bath 0.19064 21.00% 0.07116 2.67894 0.00907 
2.0bath 0.13008 13.89% 0.08690 1.49697 0.13860 
>=2.5bath 0.06613 6.84% 0.17216 0.38410 0.70199 
6 rooms -0.01506 -1.49% 0.07876 -0.19125 0.84885 
7 rooms 0.06529 6.75% 0.08843 0.73838 0.46259 
8 rooms 0.13057 13.95% 0.11277 1.15785 0.25060 
>=9 rooms -0.09255 -8.84% 0.18385 -0.50338 0.61617 
LOTSIZE 0.00003 N/A 0.00001 2.23709 0.02825 
INTERSF 0.00023 N/A 0.00010 2.25110 0.02731 
Model Summary 
# of Observations    96  Adjusted R Square 0.623 Std. Error of the Estimate 0.256299
* Omitted: built<=1920, <=5 rooms, 1Ba, Sold87-88 
 
Price Index 
In Canton, I examined the impact of a specific planning event, the creation of a pro-
development overlay district in the year 2000, and several large residential/mixed-use projects 
that were built subsequent to the rezoning.  This is a different method than in the other case 
studies, and more appropriate to track the success of the ongoing revitalization impact of the 
changes, as measured by nearby single family home prices.  The CCEOD was passed by Town 
Meeting in August of 2000, and the first of the developments was permitted and completed by 
2001. Therefore, the impact period begins in the 1999-2000 year pair and continues to the 
present.  This is shown in Figure 5.24.   
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In order to determine the ongoing effect of changes in Canton Center, I compared the 
change in sales price index 1999-2000 to 2003-05.  In this time, the impact area appreciated 
10.5%, while the control area appreciated 10.4%.  There seems to be almost no distinguishable 
impact of the rezoning and new development on surrounding single-family home values.  
However, as more data becomes available and more development occurs in Canton, it would be 
interesting to continue to track the sales trends.  In addition, there may be other benefits (or 
negative impacts) from the changes in Canton Center that are not addressed by this narrow look 
at single-family home sales prices.  
 
Table 5.24: Sales Price Index for Canton Control vs. Impact Areas 
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1 Appendix 5.1 contains a full list of independent variables that were used. 
2 The natural logarithm of the sales price is defined as en = x, where e = 2.71828… and x = the numeric sales price.  
For example, the natural logarithm of $100,000 is 11.513 (100,000 = 2.7182811.513).  The natural logarithm of the 
sales price is used as the dependent variable in all of the models in this study because these values reduce the 
difference between values and thus the weight of any wildly different sales prices.  For example, for sales prices of 
$100,000 and $2,100,000, the natural logarithms are 11.513 and 14.557 respectively.  
3 Because the output of the models refers to the natural logarithm of price, we must take the antilog of these numbers 
to interpret the result as a price.  For example, the antilog of the Reading control constant, 11.639, is e11.639 = price = 
$113,437. 
4 Appreciation is expressed as the Compound Annual Growth Rate, which is calculated as 
CAGR = (end value)/(beginning value)(1/# years)-1) 
5 I kept 2004 and 2005 transactions together because the transaction records only included sales in the first few 
months of 2005.  A 2005 only sample would have been too small and irregular for this study. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis, I analyzed five case studies that tell three different tales of multifamily 
development in the Greater Boston Area.  While none of the case studies met all of the criteria 
that I initially established, the five multifamily developments that I examined do have interesting 
characteristics such as proximity to transit and commercial areas and mixed-income components.  
I undertook this study with the intent of measuring the impact of these multifamily developments 
on surrounding single-family home values.  I found that the anticipated negative impacts of 
multifamily developments are not substantiated by the evidence.   
 
Impact of Multifamily Developments 
 In most of the towns in the Greater Boston area residents have expressed a distaste and 
distrust of new development.  This opposition is magnified as the perceived impact of the 
development increases.  For example, homeowners are particularly anxious about developments 
that are significantly larger or denser than the surrounding area, are different in tenure, quality, or 
character than the rest of the neighborhood, or which might bring the “wrong” kind of people 
into town. As I outlined in the introduction, one of the key factors motivating homeowners to 
object to nearby development is a fear that new development will negatively affect the value of 
their homes.   
In the case studies examined in this thesis, the quantitative evidence does not support the 
theory that large, multifamily developments have a negative impact on the sales price of nearby 
single-family homes.   In fact, this thesis reiterates what several previous studies conclude - there 
is no evidence that multifamily developments negatively affect the sales prices of single-family 
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homes within the impact area. In each of the four case studies that had solid quantitative results, 
the only sizable difference between the annual growth in the sales price of the average home in 
the impact zone and the average home in the rest of the town during and after the permitting and 
construction of the case development was in Abington, and it was positive in favor of the impact 
zone.1   
 
Figure 6.1: Compound Annual Growth Rate – Impact vs. Control areas of the five case study towns 
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Community Response and Growth Planning 
Despite these conclusions, my interviews indicate that this kind of evidence is but a 
starting point for a larger process of discourse and education.  In discussions with planners, town 
officials and developers, the overwhelming tale of each development was one of cooperation and 
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collaboration, negotiation and compromise, with the end result a development that turned out to 
be much better than everyone expected.  In both Concord and Abington, town officials claimed 
that the ease of the comprehensive permit process and the success of the development would 
make them more likely to proactively seek out similar developments, and in all cases, municipal 
officials agreed that a successful example development was an extremely effective way to refute 
NIMBY attitudes.  
However, responses from the public were less unequivocal.  From discussions with 
neighbors, it seems that residents see no irony in embracing a completed development at the 
same time that they condemn the next one.  All of the residents surveyed in Canton, were 
enthusiastic about the changes in Canton Center.  One longtime resident said that the 
proliferation of new businesses “brought her downtown again.”  Another new Canton resident 
confirmed that it was her home’s proximity to transit that attracted her to Canton Center.  In both 
Ipswich and Reading, the projects were a source of pride for residents.  A woman in Reading 
told me that Longwood Place is a “great resource for the community, and a terrific neighbor.” 
Her only complaint was that her houseguests weren’t allowed to park in the Longwood parking 
lot.  One resident of Concord who lives across the road from the Fairhaven Garden project 
expressed his surprise and pleasure at the development.  He stated that, “…once construction was 
done, I didn’t even notice those apartments. Those buildings don’t bother me, and I don’t notice 
any additional traffic or problems from the people who live there.”   
However, he continued that one apartment development is enough and because Concord 
is “almost developed to capacity,” he would have a hard time supporting additional 
developments like Fairhaven Gardens.  In a town that has many acres of undeveloped land, a 
minimum lot size of two acres and an average density of 0.39 units per acre, his perception of 
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maximum build out is surprising and, I would argue, inaccurate.  It seems that despite the 
presence of successful multifamily developments in town, and despite acknowledgement of these 
existing successes, public dislike of development continues.   One Beacon Residential Properties 
employee who worked on The Woodlands at Abington Station says it best: “People would rather 
have woods than any kind of development.”  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
It is tempting to conclude that with this addition to previous studies (Ritchay and 
Weinrobe, 2004 and Weinstein, 2002), the evidence is overwhelming that there is no negative 
impact of multifamily and mixed-income housing on surrounding home prices.  However, I 
believe that there are limitations to this body of research that invite further investigation and 
suggest ideas for additional research.   
First of all, both this and Ritchay and Weinrobe’s 2004 thesis focus on the Eastern 
Massachusetts residential real estate market in a time of remarkable growth, while Weinstein’s 
(2002) study looks at the San Francisco Bay area in a similarly appreciating market.  The 
residential market has been increasing astronomically in the Greater Boston Area, particularly in 
the past five years, and I would argue that economic nuances might be revealed in an equilibrium 
market that are masked in the current market.  For example, in a more tepid real estate market, 
proximity to a negative land use might affect house price more than in a market where 
everything sells for top dollar, regardless of its location.  Conducting this type of study with 
similar methodology in a slower residential market would be an interesting juxtaposition to this 
group of studies. 
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 Secondly, in this research, I found it difficult to be confident that I was identifying all of 
the critical information about a specific case study.  Even though I spoke to myriad constituents 
about some very controversial topics, the fog of memory seems to have blunted their accounts of 
the history of the permitting process and public reaction.  In some cases, the public record cast 
suspicion on these rosy accounts, but in far more cases, the public record was incomplete or 
nonexistent.  Additionally, in a study that uses interviews and the written record to paint the story 
of a development, some factors will always be left out.  I think that a valuable long-term study 
would follow one development from cradle to grave, combining a qualitative record of the 
process and the evolution of public opinion with a quantitative follow-up study of the impacts. 
 Third, I would suggest that the price trends analyzed in this and Ritchay and Weinrobe’s 
thesis continue to be monitored.  There are claims that multifamily developments, particularly 
those with a mixed-income population are constructed poorly, are not maintained well, and 
develop into eyesores, becoming a growing negative impact on the neighborhood.  To explore 
this, the price index of the impact and control zones could be tracked on an ongoing basis, with 
notation of renovations to the development or other major events. 
Finally, I think that a more expansive analysis of the changes that have happened in areas 
like Canton Center is merited.  Canton is the only one of my case studies where an intentional 
zoning change was implemented to create a growth district.  I think that a study quantifying the 
impacts of the CCEDO district in Canton Center could serve as a powerful testimony to this type 
of growth.  I found that it was the most interesting and vibrant of the case studies to visit.  An 
analysis of not only the economic impacts on surrounding property, but also a benefit/cost 
analysis of the zoning change to the town and a qualitative analysis of perceptions about the area 
would be interesting. 
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A well-designed housing price study is complex and time consuming.  Freeman and 
Botein2 note, “As with most nonexperimental social science research, the most vexing problem is 
designing methods that can satisfactorily answer the question at hand.”1  Case studies must be 
chosen carefully and impact areas determined by extensive investigation of actual neighborhood 
boundaries rather than by mere linear distance or the convenience of census or other divisions.  
All future research must avoid the methodological pitfalls that plagued earlier studies and they 
must explicitly deal with the unique design of case study developments and peculiarities of the 
towns in question.   
In a way, conducting studies with the intent of allaying fears about development is a 
thankless Sisyphean task.  To paraphrase one member of the housing community, each time you 
chip away at one misconception about development, people will find another one to introduce.  If 
and when we ever succeed in “proving” that multifamily developments cause no negative 
impacts on surrounding single-family home values, another fear will take its place.  However, 
only by adding to the body of evidence well-designed studies with clear conclusions can we 
begin to refute the fear of negative impacts of development.  While this evidence may not 
completely take away the risk adverse mindset of the NIMBYist, it may begin to persuade 
homevoters to take a chance on well-designed, well-planned developments.   
 
                                                 
                                                
1 In Abington, The Woodlands development is a reuse of a previously industrial site and thus might represent a 
positive improvement to the neighbors.   
2 Lance Freeman and Hilary Botein (2002), Subsidized Housing and Neighborhood Impacts: A Theoretical 
Discussion and Review of the Evidence, Journal of Planning Literature, 16(3), p.366. 
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APPENDIX 3.1 – CHARACTERISTICS OF DATA 
 
 
  Incomplete Suspicious * # Observations used 
Location 
Total 
Observations # % # % Control Impact 
Abington 2,900 121 4.2% 141 4.9% 2,435 203 
Canton 3,754 423 11.3% 133 3.5% 3,102 96 
Concord 3,514 43 1.2% 11 0.3% 3,360 100 
Ipswich   2,691 13 0.5% 2 0.1% 2,616 60 
Reading 5,291 6 0.1% 77 1.5% 5,061 147 
TOTAL 18,150 606 3.5% 364 2.0% 16,574 606 
* Includes outliers as well as suspicious records such as mortgage higher than sales price, properties that sold  
   two times in one day, and other suspicious transactions reserached through assessor data  
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APPENDIX 4.1 – TOWN PROFILES 
 
Characteristic Reading Ipswich  Abington Concord Canton 
1990 Households 7,932 4,699 4,817 5,693 6,605 
2000 Households 8,688 5,290 5,263 5,948 7,952 
% change 9.5% 12.6% 7.9% 4.5% 20.4% 
1990 Housing Units 8,104 5,162 4,955 5,917 6,789 
2000 Housing Units 8,823 5,601 5,348 6,153 8,163 
% Change 8.9% 8.5% 7.9% 4.0% 20.2% 
% Single Family Homes* 77.2% 72.1% 69.0% 81.4% 68.0% 
Town Median HH Income (2000) $77,059 $57,284 $57,100 $95,897 $69,260 
% of Boston Area Median Income 133.9% 99.6% 99.2% 166.7% 120.4% 
1995 Median House Value $178,000 $175,000 $114,575 $390,000 $149,500 
2005 Median House Value $427,000 $431,750 $405,000 $750,750 $498,750 
% change 139.9% 146.7% 253.5% 92.5% 233.6% 
Average Density (units/acre) 1.39 0.26 0.84 0.39 0.67 
% Subsidized Units* 7.8% 7.8% 8.3% 4.5% 10.2% 
% change from 1997-2005** +3-4% +<1% +>5% +1-2% +<1% 
* attached and detached     
 
All data is from the US Census website (http://factfinder.census.gov), except the subsidized 
housing units data, which is from the DHCD 2005 Subsidized Inventory   
(http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/components/hac/HsInvRev.pdf) and CHAPA Analysis of  
Subsidized Housing (http://www.chapa.org/0540banalysis.pdf).   
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APPENDIX 4.2 – DEVELOPMENT PROFILES 
 
Case Study Development Profiles 
Location Reading Ipswich   Abington Concord Canton 
Development 
Longwood 
Place At 
Reading  Oak Hill   
The 
Woodlands at 
Abington 
Station 
FairHaven 
Gardens Various 
Developer  Bill Chase 
 Oak Hill, Inc. / 
Immanuel 
Baptist Church 
 Beacon 
Residential 
Properties   
Ryan 
Development 
John 
Marini/Marini 
Construction 
Type 
Rental, Age-
restricted 
Rental, Age-
restricted Rental Rental 
Rental and 
Condo 
40B no yes yes yes no 
Year Permitted 1994 1988 2001 2003 2000-2004 
Year Completed 1996 1989 2003 2004 2001-2004 
Total Units 86 33 192 42 200+ 
Affordable Units 20% 33 39 11 N/A 
Affordability Profile 
20% at 50% 
AMI 
100% at up to 
80% of AMI 
20% at 50% 
AMI 
25% at 80% 
AMI market 
Density of Development 
(units per acre) 18 N/A 9.6 7 Various 
Average Density of 
Town (units per acre) 1.39 0.26 0.84 0.39 0.67 
Distance to Train 1200m 400m 200m 1200m 50-350m 
Distance to Commercial 300m 50m 1400m 850m 0-400m 
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APPENDIX 5.1 – DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
Name Definition 
sold"year" 
The year in which the house was sold, for example "sold87-88" is a house sold in the 
paired years of 1987 and 1988.  Years are paired for all cases except Abington, which 
has annual sales, for example "sold00" for records with 2000 sales 
built"year range" 
The year in which the house was originally constructed. Can be year range, or before 
(<) or after (>) a specific year. 
"#"bath 
Total number of full and half bathrooms.  For example, 1.5bath is one full and one half 
bath. 
"#"BR Total number of bedrooms.  Includes less (<) or greater (>) than values. 
"#" rooms Total number of rooms.  Includes less (<) or greater (>) than values. 
LOTSIZE Size of the lot that the house is on.  Measured in square feet. 
INTERSF Total interior size of the house.  Measured in square feet. 
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APPENDIX 5.2 – READING DESCRIPTIVE STATS AND SALES INDEX 
Reading Descriptive Statistics 
  N    Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Variable Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact 
Price 5,061 147 $257,348 $280,877 $116,820 $129,346 $27,000 $27,000 $970,000 $700,000
House sf 5,061 147 1,729 1,881 634 527 560 972 5,767 3,657 
Lot size 5,061 147 15,546 15,329 10,340 6,996 2,178 6,970 99,752 45,302 
Bedrooms 5,061 147 3.20 3.32 0.76 0.68 1.0 2.0 9.0 5.0 
   1-2BR 739 12              
   3BR 2,801 82              
   4BR 1,313 47              
   >=5BR 208 6              
Bathrooms 5,061 147 1.82 1.98 0.67 0.61 1.0 1.0 5.0 4.5 
   1bath 1,261 19              
   1.5bath 1,290 37              
   2bath 1,109 31              
   >=2.5bath 1,401 60              
Year Built 5,061 147 1947 1949 35 38 1670 1850 2002 2002 
   <=1920 926 42              
   1921-1934 487 4              
   1935-1948 696 13              
   1949-1954 735 6              
   1955-1964 751 5              
   1965-1981 700 52              
   >=1982 766 25              
Year Sold 5,061 147 1996 1996 5.2 5.1 1987 1987 2005 2005 
   1987-88 550 12              
   1989-90 505 14              
   1991-92 556 12              
   1993-94 604 26              
   1995-96 593 20              
   1997-98 583 20              
   1999-00 533 14              
   2001-02 534 5              
   2003-05 603 24                 
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE SALES PRICE INDEX 
 
Step 1: Pricing the average house (results are natural log of price) 
CONTROL Constant          LOTSIZE INTERSF
1921-
1934 
1935-
1948 
1949-
1054 
1955-
1964 
1965-
1981 >=1982 3BR 4BR >=5BR 1.5bath 2.0bath 2.5bath
%       0.096            0.138 0.145 0.148 0.138 0.151 0.553 0.259 0.041 0.255 0.219 0.277
coefficient                11.639 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.076 0.069 0.101 0.200 0.104 0.064 0.148 0.131 0.112 0.093 0.186
  11.639               0.022 0.217 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.028 0.016 0.035 0.039 0.005 0.029 0.020 0.052
SUM 12.144               
                
                
          IMPACT Constant LOTSIZE INTERSF
1921-
1934 
1935-
1948 
1949-
1054 
1955-
1964 
1965-
1981 >=1982 3BR >=4BR >=5BR 1.5bath 2.0bath 2.5bath
%       0.027            0.088 0.041 0.034 0.354 0.170 0.558 0.320 0.041 0.252 0.211 0.408
coefficient                11.764 0.000 0.000 0.108 0.218 0.192 0.120 0.402 0.365 0.160 0.317 0.337 -0.025 -0.041 0.061
  11.764               0.015 0.070 0.003 0.019 0.008 0.004 0.142 0.062 0.089 0.101 0.014 -0.006 -0.009 0.025
SUM 12.301               
 
 
Step 2: Pricing the average house over time 
  CONTROL Sold87-88 Sold89-90 Sold91-92       Sold93-94 Sold95-96 Sold97-98 Sold99-00 Sold01-02 Sold03-05
  0.0000 -0.04916 -0.09172 -0.01922 0.07357 0.16222 0.38840 0.65854 0.80967 
IMPACT Sold87-88         Sold89-90 Sold91-92 Sold93-94 Sold95-96 Sold97-98 Sold99-00 Sold01-02 Sold03-05
           0.0000 -0.1829 -0.0634 -0.0732 -0.1060 0.1344 0.4078 0.3132 0.7377
 
Control  Impact
SUM 12.14426749 
1987-1988  12.14427 188,013
1989-1990  12.09510 178,993
1991-1992  12.05255 171,536
1993-1994  12.12505 184,434
1995-1996 12.21784 202,367 
1997-1998  12.30648 221,125
1999-2000  12.53266 277,247
2001-2002  12.80281 363,237
2003-2005  12.95394 422,496 
SUM 12.30134788 
1987-1988  12.30135 219,992
1989-1990   12.11840 183,213
1991-1992   12.23794 206,476
1993-1994   12.22812 204,459
1995-1996 12.19537 197,871 
1997-1998   12.43570 251,627
1999-2000   12.70915 330,761
2001-2002   12.61452 300,897
2003-2005   13.03907 460,041 
 
 
APPENDIX 5.3 – IPSWICH DESCRIPTIVE STATS  
Ipswich Descriptive Statistics 
  N    Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Variable Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact 
Price 2,616 60 $279,311 $226,660 $190,532 $110,996 $17,100 $30,000 $194,500 $595,000 
House sf 2,616 60 2,269 1,744 1,076 679 480 824 7,675 3,849 
Lot size 2,616 60 44,606 8,037 116,481 7,135 1,307 1,742 2,589,206 43,560 
Bedrooms 2,616 60 3.09 2.98 0.83 0.91 1.0 1.0 6.0 7.0 
   1BR 70 1              
   2BR 441 16              
   3BR 1,420 29              
   >=4BR 685 14              
Bathrooms 2,616 60 2.09 1.63 0.88 0.62 1.0 1.0 5.5 3.5 
   1bath 588 20              
   1.5bath 388 20              
   2.0bath 530 9              
   2.5bath 658 8              
   >=3.0bath 452 3              
Year Built 2,616 60 1952 1834 52 81 1665 1652 2004 1936 
   <1920 477 51              
   1920-1954 514 9              
   1955-1969 488 0              
   1970-1991 585 0              
   >=1992 552 0              
Year Sold 2,616 60 1996 1997 5.2 5.1 1987 1988 2005 2005 
   1987-88 309 5              
   1989-90 201 4              
   1991-92 246 4              
   1993-94 294 7              
   1995-96 281 7              
   1997-98 328 5              
   1999-00 333 8              
   2001-02 287 12              
   2003-05 337 8                 
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APPENDIX 5.4 – ABINGTON DESCRIPTIVE STATS AND SALES INDEX 
Abington Descriptive Statistics 
  N   Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Variable Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact 
Price 2,435 203 $194,274 $180,248 $134,225 $83,657 $10,000 $34,000 $2,500,000 $462,000 
House sf 2,435 203 1,670 1,593 712 557 504 576 8,052 3,814 
Lot size 2,435 203 23,526 24,048 16,259 16,681 2,002 3,822 112,366 108,881 
Bedrooms 2,435 203 3.05 3.04 0.76 0.75 1.0 1.0 7.0 6.0 
   1-2BR 471 33              
   3BR 1,433 130              
   >=4BR 531 40              
Bathrooms 2,435 203 1.76 1.61 0.74 0.60 1.0 1.0 7.0 4.5 
   1bath 818 75              
   1.5bath 494 47              
   2bath 452 49              
   >=2.5bath 671 32              
Year Built 2,435 203 1950 1937 40 48 1751 1800 2004 2004 
   <=1900 435 57              
   1901-1945 252 24              
   1946-1959 717 19              
   1960-1971 240 56              
   1972-1990 340 29              
   >=1991 451 18              
Year Sold 2,435 203 1996 1996 5.1 5.3 1987 1987 2005 2005 
1987 137 11              
1988 119 10              
1989 86 7              
1990 94 3              
1991 116 10              
1992 137 8              
1993 157 17              
1994 147 15              
1995 136 14              
1996 119 9              
1997 127 11              
1998 144 10              
1999 180 14              
2000 176 7              
2001 132 12              
2002 118 12              
2003 143 10              
2004-5 167 23                 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SALES PRICE INDEX 
 
Step 1: Pricing the average house (results are natural log of price) 
CONTROL Constant         LOTSIZE INTERSF
1901-
1945 
1946-
1959 
   1960-
1971 
   1972-
1990 >=1991 3BR >=4BR 1.5Ba 2Ba >=2.5Ba
%       10.3% 29.4% 9.9% 14.0% 18.5% 58.9% 21.8% 20.3%   18.6% 27.6%
coefficient 11.31143             1.81E-06 0.000202 0.0391 0.1199 0.1708 0.2890 0.2148 -0.0027 0.0237 0.0358 -0.0059 0.1071
  11.31143             0.042612 0.337801 0.0041 0.0353 0.0168 0.0404 0.0398 -0.0016 0.0052 0.0073 -0.0011 0.0295
SUM 11.86745             
              
IMPACT Constant         LOTSIZE INTERSF
1901-
1945 
1946-
1959 
   1960-
1971 
   1972-
1990 >=1991 3BR >=4BR 1.5Ba 2Ba >=2.5Ba
%       11.8% 9.4% 27.6% 14.3% 8.9% 64.0% 19.7% 24.1%   24.1% 15.8%
coefficient 11.33257             0.000005 0.000122 -0.1496 0.1243 0.1552 0.2210 0.1288 0.0843 -0.0945 0.0758 0.0282 0.1136
  11.33257             0.110827 0.195025 -0.0177 0.0116 0.0428 0.0316 0.0114 0.0540 -0.0186 0.0183 0.0068 0.0179
SUM 11.79656             
 
Step 2: Pricing the average house over time 
sold87                 sold88 sold89 sold90 sold91 sold92 sold93 sold94 sold95 sold96 sold97 sold98 sold99 sold00 sold01 sold02 sold03 Sold04-05 
C 0.000                  0.075 0.009 -0.155 -0.133 -0.119 -0.186 -0.127 -0.141 -0.070 -0.004 0.113 0.221 0.368 0.504 0.611 0.758 0.904
sold87                 sold88 sold89 sold90 sold91 sold92 sold93 sold94 sold95 sold96 sold97 sold98 sold99 sold00 sold01 sold02 sold03 sold04-05 
I 0.000                  0.182 0.128 -0.003 -0.089 -0.281 -0.181 -0.010 -0.136 -0.003 -0.027 0.178 0.156 0.173 0.549 0.553 0.730 0.946
 
Control  Impact
SUM 11.86745467    
SOLD:      lnPRICE PRICE SOLD: lnPRICE PRICE
1987 11.86745  $  142,551  1996 11.79775 $132,952 
1988 11.94292  $  153,725  1997 11.86345 $141,981 
1989 11.87617  $  143,799  1998 11.98090 $159,676 
1990 11.71212  $  122,041  1999 12.08857 $177,828 
1991 11.73452  $  124,807  2000 12.23565 $206,003 
1992 11.74889  $  126,613  2001 12.37128 $235,929 
1993 11.68161  $  118,374  2002 12.47828 $262,572 
1994 11.74090  $  125,606  2003 12.62568 $304,272 
1995 11.72609  $  123,759  2004-5 12.77181 $352,148  
SUM 11.79656204    
SOLD:      lnPRICE PRICE SOLD: lnPRICE PRICE
1987 11.79656  $  132,795 1996 11.79357 $132,399 
1988 11.97808  $  159,225  1997 11.76985 $129,295 
1989 11.92500  $  150,995  1998 11.97415 $158,602 
1990 11.79340  $  132,376  1999 11.95250 $155,204 
1991 11.70741  $  121,469  2000 11.96980 $157,913 
1992 11.51585  $  100,293  2001 12.34563 $229,953 
1993 11.61557  $  110,810  2002 12.34969 $230,889 
1994 11.78637  $  131,449  2003 12.52657 $275,563 
1995 11.66072  $  115,927  2004-5 12.74264 $342,025  
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APPENDIX 5.5 – CONCORD DESCRIPTIVE STATS AND SALES INDEX 
Concord Descriptive Statistics 
  N    Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Variable Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact 
Price 3,360 100 $522,791 $430,802 $428,048 $274,996 $10,398 $106,000 $6,025,000 $1,800,000
House sf 3,360 100 2,603 2,314 1,364 1,530 321 1,076 14,286 9,276 
Lot size 3,360 100 47,814 39,004 74,206 56,677 1,742 5,227 1,241,024 290,545 
Bedrooms 3,360 100 3.76 3.50 0.91 0.84 1.0 2.0 8.0 6.0 
   1-2BR 192 5              
   3BR 1,120 53              
   4BR 1,434 33              
   >=5BR 614 9              
Bathrooms 3,360 100 2.79 2.19 1.33 1.10 1.0 1.0 9.5 6.5 
   1bath 258 13              
   1.5-2.0bath 947 45              
   2.5bath 1,015 26              
   3.0-4.0bath 514 10              
   >=4.5bath 626 6              
Year Built 3,360 100 1946 1934 44 46 1659 1720 2004 1999 
   <=1900 510 11              
   1901-1945 487 40              
   1946-1954 487 21              
   1955-1964 540 9              
   1965-1974 581 9              
   1975-1984 277 3              
   >=1985 478 7              
Year Sold 3,360 100 1996 1996 5.0 4.9 1987 1987 2005 2005 
   1987-88 317 11              
   1989-90 296 8              
   1991-92 418 6              
   1993-94 416 13              
   1995-96 415 10              
   1997-98 428 20              
   1999-00 419 11              
   2001-02 312 13              
   2003-05 339 8                 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SALES PRICE INDEX 
 
Step 1: Pricing the average house (results are natural log of price) 
CONTROL Constant 
Lot 
size 
House 
sf    3BR    4BR 
   
>=5BR 
   1.5-
2.0bath 
   
2.5bath 
   3.0-
4.0bath 
 >=4.5 
bath 
 1901-
1945 
 1946-
1954 
1955-
1964 
1965-
1974 
1975-
1984 
   
>=1985 
%       33.3% 42.7% 18.3% 28.2% 30.2% 15.3%        18.6% 14.5% 14.5% 16.1% 17.3% 8.2% 14.2%
coefficient                 11.840 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.121 0.132 0.141 0.262 0.331 0.432 0.037 -0.076 -0.030 0.003 0.067 0.089
  11.840                0.052 0.454 0.016 0.052 0.024 0.040 0.079 0.051 0.080 0.005 -0.011 -0.005 0.000 0.006 0.013
SUM 12.69482                
                 
IMPACT Constant 
Lot 
size 
House 
sf    3BR    4BR 
   
>=5BR 
   1.5-
2.0bath 
   
2.5bath 
   3.0-
4.0bath 
 >=4.5 
bath 
 1901-
1945 
 1946-
1954 
 1955-
1964 
1965-
1974 
1975-
1984 >=1985 
%       53.0% 33.0% 9.0% 45.0% 26.0% 10.0%        6.0% 40.0% 0.210 9.0% 9.0% 3.0% 7.0%
coefficient                 11.875 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.101 0.277 0.188 0.309 0.580 -0.174 0.070 -0.028 -0.164 0.098 0.038 -0.195
  11.875                0.173 0.253 0.031 0.033 0.025 0.085 0.080 0.058 -0.010 0.028 -0.006 -0.015 0.009 0.001 -0.014
SUM 12.60515                               
 
 
Step 2: Pricing the average house over time 
CONTROL Sold87-88         Sold89-90 Sold91-92 Sold93-94 Sold95-96 Sold97-98 Sold99-00 Sold01-02 Sold03-05
  0.0000         -0.030180 -0.090259 0.002288 0.128954 0.279214 0.486871 0.725713 0.875876
IMPACT Sold87-88         Sold89-90 Sold91-92 Sold93-94 Sold95-96 Sold97-98 Sold99-00 Sold01-02 Sold03-05
  0.0000         -0.0566 -0.0187 -0.1263 -0.0120 0.1631 0.5120 0.6926 0.8343
 
Control 
SUM 12.69482136 
1987-1988  12.69482 $326,055
1989-1990  12.66464 $316,362
1991-1992  12.60456 $297,915
1993-1994  12.69711 $326,802
1995-1996  12.82378 $370,932
1997-1998  12.97403 $431,074
1999-2000  13.18169 $530,562
2001-2002  13.42053 $673,696
2003-2005 13.57070 $782,851  
Impact 
SUM 12.60515216 
1987-1988  12.60515 $298,090
1989-1990  12.54859 $281,699
1991-1992  12.58646 $292,570
1993-1994  12.47885 $262,722
1995-1996  12.59312 $294,525
1997-1998  12.76821 $350,882
1999-2000  13.11717 $497,409
2001-2002  13.29776 $595,862
2003-2005 13.43947 $686,574  
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APPENDIX 5.6 – CANTON DESCRIPTIVE STATS AND SALES INDEX 
Canton Descriptive Statistics 
  N   Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Variable Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact Control Impact 
Price 3,102 96 $287,214 $183,522 $164,307 $74,418 $12,500 $30,000 $2,150,000 $400,900 
House sf 3,102 96 2,029 1,504 979 429 480 517 13,263 2,562 
Lot size 3,102 96 25,198 8,490 20,094 3,057 3,485 2,178 152,460 14,375 
Tot Rooms 3,102 96 7.65 6.33 1.77 1.40 1.0 3.0 17.0 10.0 
<=5rooms 284 25              
6rooms 474 28              
7rooms 742 24              
8rooms 739 15              
9+rooms 863 4              
Bathrooms 3,102 96 2.07 1.48 0.84 0.46 1.0 1.0 8.5 3.0 
   1bath 557 35              
   1.5bath 738 37              
   2bath 450 18              
   >=2.5bath 1,357 6              
Year Built 3,102 96 1959 1921 36 36 1700 1850 2002 1999 
   <=1920 335 48              
   1921-1949 316 15              
   1950-1959 692 28              
  >=1960 1,759 5              
Year Sold 3,102 96 1996 1996 5.1 4.9 1987 1987 2005 2004 
   1987-88 313 6              
   1989-90 270 9              
   1991-92 321 10              
   1993-94 318 11              
   1995-96 378 8              
   1997-98 419 20              
   1999-00 394 7              
   2001-02 337 13              
   2003-05 352 12                 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SALES PRICE INDEX 
 
Step 1: Pricing the average house (results are natural log of price) 
CONTROL Constant       LOTSIZE INTERSF 1921-1949 1950-1959 >=1960 1.5bath 2.0bath >=2.5bath 6 rooms 7 rooms 8 rooms 9+ rooms 
%       10.2% 22.3% 56.7% 23.8% 14.5% 43.7% 15.3% 23.9% 23.8% 27.8% 
coefficient              11.48427 0.000001 0.000162 0.0678 0.1013 0.2264 0.0782 0.0559 0.1730 0.0621 0.0981 0.1396 0.1509
  11.48427             0.036141 0.328834 0.0069 0.0226 0.1284 0.0186 0.0081 0.0757 0.0095 0.0235 0.0333 0.0420
SUM 12.21766             
              
IMPACT Constant       LOTSIZE INTERSF 1921-1949 1950-1959 >=1960 1.5bath 2.0bath >=2.5bath 6 rooms 7 rooms 8 rooms 9+ rooms 
%       10.2% 22.3% 56.7% 23.8% 14.5% 43.7% 15.3% 23.9% 23.8% 27.8% 
coefficient              11.10751 0.000026 0.000226 0.1515 0.2667 0.3200 0.1906 0.1301 0.0661 -0.0151 0.0653 0.1306 -0.0925
  11.10751             0.218987 0.339604 0.0154 0.0595 0.1815 0.0454 0.0189 0.0289 -0.0023 0.0156 0.0311 -0.0257
SUM 12.03432             
 
Step 2: Pricing the average house over time 
Sold87-88         Sold89-90 Sold91-92 Sold93-94 Sold95-96 Sold97-98 Sold99-00 Sold01-02 Sold03-05
Control 0.0000         -0.0449 -0.0977 -0.0818 0.0241 0.1323 0.3605 0.6156 0.8548
Sold87-88         Sold89-90 Sold91-92 Sold93-94 Sold95-96 Sold97-98 Sold99-00 Sold01-02 Sold03-05
Impact 0.0000         -0.00049 -0.16390 -0.25534 -0.04382 0.06170 0.25687 0.51550 0.75661
 
Control  Impact
SUM 12.21765891 
SOLD IN: lnPRICE PRICE 
1987-1988 12.21766  $ 202,331  
1989-1990 12.17275  $ 193,446  
1991-1992 12.11998  $ 183,501  
1993-1994 12.13589  $ 186,444  
1995-1996 12.24172  $ 207,258  
1997-1998 12.34996  $ 230,951  
1999-2000 12.57819  $ 290,160  
2001-2002 12.83323  $ 374,456  
2003-2005 13.07247  $ 475,666   
SUM 12.03432366 
SOLD IN: lnPRICE PRICE 
1987-1988 12.03432  $ 168,438 
1989-1990 12.03383  $ 168,355 
1991-1992 11.87042  $ 142,975 
1993-1994 11.77898  $ 130,481 
1995-1996 11.99050  $ 161,216 
1997-1998 12.09602  $ 179,158 
1999-2000 12.29119  $ 217,769 
2001-2002 12.54982  $ 282,044 
2003-2005 12.79094  $ 358,950  
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Case Study Development Profiles
Location Reading Ipswich  Abington Concord Canton
Development
Longwood Place 
At Reading Oak Hill  
The Woodlands at
Abington Station
 FairHaven 
Gardens Various
Developer Bill Chase
 Oak Hill, Inc. / 
Immanuel Baptist 
Church
 Beacon 
Residential 
Properties  
Ryan 
Development
John 
Marini/Marini 
Construction
Type
Rental, Age-
restricted
Rental, Age-
restricted Rental Rental
Rental and 
Condo
40B no yes yes yes no
Year Permitted 1994 1988 2001 2003 2000-2004
Year Completed 1996 1989 2003 2004 2001-2004
Total Units 86 33 192 42 200+
Affordable Units 20% 33 39 11 N/A
Affordability Profile
20% at 50% 
AMI
100% at up to 
80% of AMI
20% at 50% 
AMI
25% at 80% 
AMI market
Density of Development 
(units per acre) 18 N/A 9.6 7 Various
Average Density of Town 
(units per acre) 1.39 0.26 0.84 0.39 0.67
Distance to Train 1200m 400m 200m 1200m 50-350m
Distance to Commercial 300m 50m 1400m 850m 0-400m
Name Definition
sold"year"
The year in which the house was sold, for example "sold87-88" is a house sold in the 
paired years of 1987 and 1988.  Years are paired for all cases except Abington, 
which has annual sales, for example "sold00" for records with 2000 sales
built"year range"
The year in which the house was originally constructed. Can be year range, or before
(<) or after (>) a specific year.
"#"bath
Total number of full and half bathrooms.  For example, 1.5bath is one full and one 
half bath.
"#"BR Total number of bedrooms.  Includes less (<) or greater (>) than values.
"#" rooms Total number of rooms.  Includes less (<) or greater (>) than values.
LOTSIZE Size of the lot that the house is on.  Measured in square feet.
INTERSF Total interior size of the house.  Measured in square feet.
Ipswich  Concord Abington Canton Reading Manchester by the Sea Boston (Jamaica Plain)
1988  $   174,500  $   249,000  $   139,000  $   188,000  $   179,000 
1989  $   169,000  $   240,000  $   138,000  $   164,500  $   185,000 
1990  $   165,500  $   320,000  $   117,250  $   155,000  $   184,000 
1991  $   157,250  $   240,500  $     88,000  $   192,500  $   182,450 
1992  $   155,500  $   220,000  $   109,300  $   183,500  $   170,000 
1993  $   151,000  $   240,000  $   138,500  $   177,950  $   189,000 
1994  $   165,500  $   430,000  $   109,400  $   165,000  $   168,750 
1995  $   175,000  $   390,000  $   114,575  $   149,500  $   178,000 
1996  $   195,000  $   236,250  $   128,000  $   201,250  $   180,000 
1997  $   206,500  $   437,500  $   127,200  $   212,500  $   167,500 
1998  $   240,000  $   360,000  $   150,000  $   227,250  $   223,500 
1999  $   256,500  $   374,000  $   155,000  $   312,000  $   249,500 
2000  $   299,000  $   625,500  $   184,950  $   292,500  $   269,900 
2001  $   325,000  $   682,250  $   170,000  $   297,450  $   246,250 
2002  $   344,000  $   620,000  $   206,200  $   326,225  $   320,000 
2003  $   408,000  $   715,000  $   350,000  $   368,000  $   405,000 
2004  $   455,000  $   750,000  $   290,000  $   433,700  $   425,000 
2005  $   431,750  $   750,750  $   405,000  $   498,750  $   427,000 
http://rers.thewarrengroup.com/townstats/search.asp
94-04 175% 74% 165% 163% 152%
Appreciation of SF Homes
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Year
M
ed
ia
n 
Sa
le
s 
Pr
ic
e Ipswich
Concord
Reading
Abington
Canton
Linear (Abington)
Characteristic Reading Ipswich  Abington Concord Canton
1990 Households 7,932 4,699 4,817 5,693 6,605
2000 Households 8,688 5,290 5,263 5,948 7,952
% change 9.5% 12.6% 7.9% 4.5% 20.4%
1990 Housing Units 8,104 5,162 4,955 5,917 6,789
2000 Housing Units 8,823 5,601 5,348 6,153 8,163
% Change 8.9% 8.5% 7.9% 4.0% 20.2%
% Single Family Homes* 77.2% 72.1% 69.0% 81.4% 68.0%
Town Median HH Income (2000) $77,059 $57,284 $57,100 $95,897 $69,260
% of Boston Area Median Income 133.9% 99.6% 99.2% 166.7% 120.4%
1995 Median House Value $178,000 $175,000 $114,575 $390,000 $149,500
2005 Median House Value $427,000 $431,750 $405,000 $750,750 $498,750
% change 139.9% 146.7% 253.5% 92.5% 233.6%
Average Density (units/acre) 1.39 0.26 0.84 0.39 0.67
% Subsidized Units* 7.8% 7.8% 8.3% 4.5% 10.2%
% change from 1997-2005** +3-4% +<1% +>5% +1-2% +<1%
* attached and detached
All data is from the US Census website (http://factfinder.census.gov), except the subsidized
housing units data, which is from the DHCD 2005 Subsidized Inventory 
(http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/components/hac/HsInvRev.pdf) and CHAPA Analysis of 
Subsidized Housing (http://www.chapa.org/0540banalysis.pdf).
* 
** 
Abington Affordable Housing Strategy, September, 2003, http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/ToolKit/PProd/apAbing.pdf
http://www1.miser.umass.edu/datacenter/Census2000/SF3/medianhholdinc99.PDF
http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/encyclopedia/C/Ca/Canton,_Massachusetts.htm
http://commpres.env.state.ma.us/community/cmty_profile.asp?communityID=144&communityName=Ipswich&communityCode=ipsw&communityType=
APPENDIX
Location # % # % Control Impact
Abington 2,900 121 4.2% 141 4.9% 2,435 203
Canton 3,754 423 11.3% 133 3.5% 3,102 96
Concord 3,514 43 1.2% 11 0.3% 3,360 100
Ipswich  2,691 13 0.5% 2 0.1% 2,616 60
Reading 5,291 6 0.1% 77 1.5% 5,061 147
TOTAL 18,150 606 3.5% 364 2.0% 16,574 606
* Includes outliers as well as suspicious records such as mortgage higher than sales price, properties that sold 
   two times in one day, and other suspicious transactions reserached through assessor data
Incomplete Suspicious * # Observations used
Total Observations
Figure 
5.1
Develop
ment 
Name
Washingt
on Place
Forge 
Pond
Canton 
Common
s / Paul 
Revere 
Village
Grover 
Estates
d 2001 2003 2004 developm
Units 47 38 206 affordable
Tenure Rental Condo Condo Condo
Compone 10,000sf 8,000sf None 6,500sf
Location Reading Ipswich  Abington Concord Canton
Development
Longwood Place 
At Reading Oak Hill  
The Woodlands at 
Abington Station
FairHaven 
Gardens Various
Developer Bill Chase
 Oak Hill, Inc. / 
Immanuel Baptist 
Church
 Beacon 
Residential 
Properties  
Ryan 
Development
John 
Marini/Marini 
Construction
Type
Rental, Age-
restricted
Rental, Age-
restricted Rental Rental
Rental and 
Condo
40B no yes yes yes no
Year Permitted 1994 1988 2001 2003 2000-2004
Year Completed 1996 1989 2003 2004 2001-2004
Total Units 86 33 192 42 200+
Affordable Units 20% 33 39 11 N/A
Affordability Profile
20% at 50% 
AMI
100% at up to 
80% of AMI
20% at 50% 
AMI
25% at 80% 
AMI market
Density of Development 
(units per acre) 18 N/A 9.6 7 Various
Average Density of Town 
(units per acre) 1.39 0.26 0.84 0.39 0.67
Distance to Train 1200m 400m 200m 1200m 50-350m
Distance to Commercial 300m 50m 1400m 850m 0-400m
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